leyu-data-collection-platform/leyu-frontend — Repobility public scan

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leyu-data-collection-platform/leyu-frontend

https://github.com/leyu-data-collection-platform/leyu-frontend.git · scanned 2026-05-16 18:00 UTC (23 hours, 24 minutes ago) · 10 languages

304 findings (58 legacy + 246 scanner) 5th percentile · Typescript · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 76 (lower by 22)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 23 hours, 24 minutes ago · v2 · 181 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

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88.9% cov · 123 gaps

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all

Scan summary Repository scanned at 76.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 1484 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 123 findings — concentrated in software (44), frontend (40), quality (30). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 4 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the software layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 17 of 181 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.

Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…

src/app/components/project/updateProjectModal.tsx:105 ssrflegacy

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.

Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…

src/app/components/project/addProjectModal.tsx:334 ssrflegacy

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.

Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…

src/app/api/auth/[...nextauth]/route.ts:177 ssrflegacy

high Legacy quality testing No test files found

Add a test directory (tests/ or __tests__/) with unit tests for core functionality. Use pytest (Python), Jest (JS/TS), or go test (Go). Start with tests for critical business logic and security-sensitive functions.

testinglegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/components/usersProject/updateUserForm.tsx:164 authlegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/components/usersProject/addUserForm.tsx:136 authlegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/components/users/updateUserForm.tsx:165 authlegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/components/users/addUserForm.tsx:352 authlegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/(public)/linkForm/reviewer/[invitation_link_id]/page.tsx:344 authlegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/(public)/linkForm/facilitator/[invitation_link_id]/page.tsx:344 authlegacy

high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value

Settings screens sometimes render API keys, tokens, or passwords back into HTML/JSX password fields. That still exposes the secret to page source, browser extensions, screenshots, and DOM scraping.

src/app/(public)/linkForm/contributor/[invitation_link_id]/page.tsx:345 authlegacy

high 9-layer api wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/getAuthToken (src/lib/hooks/useFetchUser.ts:132)

`src/lib/hooks/useFetchUser.ts:132` calls `GET /api/getAuthToken` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/getauthtoken` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.

wiringdangling-fetchfetch

high 9-layer api wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/getAuthToken (src/lib/hooks/useProject.ts:108)

`src/lib/hooks/useProject.ts:108` calls `GET /api/getAuthToken` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/getauthtoken` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.

wiringdangling-fetchfetch

high 9-layer api wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/tasks/${taskId} (src/app/components/project/taskDetail.tsx:18)

`src/app/components/project/taskDetail.tsx:18` calls `GET /api/tasks/${taskId}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/tasks/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher s…

wiringdangling-fetchfetch

high 9-layer api wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/tasks/${taskId} (src/app/components/projectManager/taskDetail.tsx:18)

`src/app/components/projectManager/taskDetail.tsx:18` calls `GET /api/tasks/${taskId}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/tasks/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the ma…

wiringdangling-fetchfetch

high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.76 Dockerfile copies broad context with incomplete .dockerignore

COPY . or ADD . is safer when .dockerignore excludes secrets, git history, keys, and generated artifacts.

Dockerfile:16 dockerlegacy

high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.62 Compose service lacks no-new-privileges hardening

no-new-privileges prevents processes from gaining additional privileges through setuid binaries or file capabilities.

docker-compose.yml:3 dockerlegacy

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