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numpy/numpy

https://github.com/numpy/numpy.git · scanned 2026-05-16 12:55 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

273 findings (20 legacy + 253 scanner) 2/10 scanners ran 88th percentile · Python · huge (>500K LoC) Scanner says 99 (lower by 17)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 11 hours ago · v1 · 265 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
89.9
/100
Repobility
81
12 legacy
9-layer
99
88.9% cov · 253 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 14 Medium 14 Low 182 Source: Legacy 12 9-layer 253 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 69 Security 16 Quality 177 Api 1 Frontend 1 Cicd 1
Scan summary Repository scanned at 99.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 13741 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 253 findings — concentrated in quality (173), software (67), security (10). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 9 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 14 of 265 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Legacy security injection conf 0.50 [SEC005] Command Injection Risk: Unsafe shell execution or eval of user input.
Use subprocess with shell=False and a list of args. Never eval user input.
tools/write_release.py:54 injectionlegacy
medium Legacy security deserialization conf 1.00 [SEC007] Unsafe Deserialization: Unsafe deserialization can execute arbitrary code.
Use yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load(). Avoid pickle for untrusted data.
numpy/_core/src/multiarray/methods.c:2110 deserializationlegacy
medium Legacy security deserialization conf 1.00 [SEC007] Unsafe Deserialization: Unsafe deserialization can execute arbitrary code.
Use yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load(). Avoid pickle for untrusted data.
numpy/_core/src/multiarray/multiarraymodule.c:2207 deserializationlegacy
medium Legacy security deserialization conf 1.00 [SEC007] Unsafe Deserialization: Unsafe deserialization can execute arbitrary code.
Use yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load(). Avoid pickle for untrusted data.
numpy/_core/records.py:703 deserializationlegacy
medium Legacy security crypto conf 1.00 [SEC014] SSL Verification Disabled: SSL certificate verification is disabled, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks.
Enable SSL verification. Use verify=True (default) for requests. Pin certificates if needed.
numpy/_core/multiarray.py:112 cryptolegacy
medium Legacy software redos conf 1.00 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like `(a+)+` or quantified alternation with overlapping branches. On adversarial input these patterns exhibit exponential backtracking, freezing the process. CWE-1333. Real CVEs: CVE-2017-16129 (minimatch), CVE-2021-3807 (ansi-regex), and dozens more.
Three options, pick one: 1. Rewrite the pattern to avoid nested quantifiers. E.g. `(a+)+` is functionally equivalent to `a+` for matching purposes. 2. Use Google's re2 (`pip install google-re2`): linear-time, drop-in replacement for `re` for most use cases. 3. Set a hard timeout: `s…
tools/c_coverage/c_coverage_report.py:119 redoslegacy
medium Legacy quality quality Average file size is 646 lines (recommend <300)
Refactor large files by extracting related functions into separate modules. Target files with 300+ lines first. Use the Single Responsibility Principle — each module should have one clear purpose.
qualitylegacy
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/scorecards.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — benchmarks/asv_pip_nopep517.py:17
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — numpy/f2py/_backends/_meson.py:185
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tools/check_python_h_first.py:219
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tools/linter.py:26
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tools/write_release.py:55
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer security coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
coverageauth
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
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