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ZclassiC23/zclassic

https://github.com/ZclassiC23/zclassic · scanned 2026-06-16 01:11 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

17 raw signals (0 security + 17 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 17 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 17 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 9 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 17 Crowd 0 Layer: Network 3 Frontend 1 Security 2 Cicd 2 Quality 9

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 65.9/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 2052 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 17 findings — concentrated in quality (9), network (3), security (2). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 17 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in Makefile:380

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

Makefile:380 Exec used

high System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 pull_request_target workflow appears to check out untrusted PR code

pull_request_target runs with base-repo privileges. Checking out PR head code in that context can expose repository tokens or secrets to attacker-controlled code.

.github/workflows/pr-security-review.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .mcp.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.mcp.json VerificationMcp config

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 2 in use

Port 2 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

tools/scripts/replay_canary.sh Ports

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 23 in use

Port 23 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

tools/scripts/soak_evidence.sh Ports

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 30 in use

Port 30 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

tools/scripts/replay_canary.sh Ports

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 2 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 20 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/download-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/pr-security-comment.yml:26 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places

Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: tools/gen_mcp_reference.py:render_params, tools/gen_mcp_reference.py:render This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.

duplicatesduplication

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.

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