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ytchokni/econ-newsfeed

https://github.com/ytchokni/econ-newsfeed · scanned 2026-06-16 01:08 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

60 raw signals (0 security + 60 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 55 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
49.8
/100
Security checks
50
0 findings
System graph
50
100.0% cov · 55 findings
Critical
1
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 4 Medium 12 Low 31 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 55 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 6 Frontend 5 Hardware 2 Security 6 Cicd 4 Quality 14 Api 18
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 49.8/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 2289 nodes across 22 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 60 findings — concentrated in api (18), quality (15), security (7). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 4 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 47 of 55 actionable findings. 60 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in scripts/sync_prod_db.sh
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
lines 42
scripts/sync_prod_db.sh:42 (2 hits)
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/admin/login (app/src/app/admin/LoginForm.tsx:20)
`app/src/app/admin/LoginForm.tsx:20` calls `POST /api/admin/login` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/admin/login` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/admin/logout (app/src/app/admin/AdminDashboard.tsx:51)
`app/src/app/admin/AdminDashboard.tsx:51` calls `POST /api/admin/logout` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/admin/logout` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `reactivate_url` without auth dependency — api.py:495
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api.py:495 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `trigger_scrape` without auth dependency — api.py:914
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api.py:914 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/src/app/admin/layout.tsx:9
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/src/app/admin/AdminDashboard.tsx:51
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/src/app/api/admin/dashboard/route.ts:41
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/src/lib/api.ts:19
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 2 locations
.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml:36
.github/workflows/claude.yml:35
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/claude.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/src/app/admin/layout.tsx:9
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/src/app/admin/layout.tsx:9 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 12 placeholder/mock markers across 5 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 7 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `API_INTERNAL_URL`, `DB_POOL_SIZE`, `DB_SSL_CA`, `FT_MIN_TOKEN_SIZE`, `NODE_ENV`, `SCRAPER_USER_AGENT`, `SCRAPE_RATE_LIMIT_FAST_SECONDS`. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.
config drift
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 73 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 2 occurrences Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:20-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
lines 1, 11
app/Dockerfile:1, 11 (2 hits)
containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 2 locations
.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml:30
.github/workflows/claude.yml:29
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 18 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: scripts/cleanup_data_quality.py:writes, scripts/cleanup_data_quality.py:writes, scripts/cleanup_data_quality.py:writes, scripts/cleanup_data_quality.py:writes This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://…
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: publication.py:coerce_year_to_str, publication.py:coerce_year_to_str This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: classify_link_type
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
link_extractor.py:105
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: create_database
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/schema.py:14
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: escape_fulltext
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/search_helpers.py:16
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: escape_like
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/search_helpers.py:6
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: is_trusted_domain
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
link_extractor.py:121
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: writes
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/cleanup_data_quality.py:640
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/admin/at-risk-urls
`api.py` declares `GET /api/admin/at-risk-urls` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/admin/dashboard
`api.py` declares `GET /api/admin/dashboard` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/admin/deactivated-urls
`api.py` declares `GET /api/admin/deactivated-urls` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/feed.xml
`api.py` declares `GET /api/feed.xml` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/fields
`api.py` declares `GET /api/fields` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/filter-options
`api.py` declares `GET /api/filter-options` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/health
`api.py` declares `GET /api/health` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/jel-codes
`api.py` declares `GET /api/jel-codes` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/metrics
`api.py` declares `GET /api/metrics` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/publications
`api.py` declares `GET /api/publications` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/publications/{publication_id}
`api.py` declares `GET /api/publications/{publication_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/researchers
`api.py` declares `GET /api/researchers` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/researchers/{researcher_id}
`api.py` declares `GET /api/researchers/{researcher_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/scrape/status
`api.py` declares `GET /api/scrape/status` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /api/admin/reactivate-url/{url_id}
`api.py` declares `POST /api/admin/reactivate-url/{url_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /api/scrape
`api.py` declares `POST /api/scrape` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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