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EvanBacon/serve-sim

https://github.com/EvanBacon/serve-sim · scanned 2026-05-16 22:30 UTC (21 hours, 53 minutes ago) · 10 languages

74 findings (9 legacy + 65 scanner) 68th percentile · Typescript · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 89 (lower by 13)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 21 hours, 54 minutes ago · v1 · 74 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 10 Medium 18 Low 31 Source: Legacy 9 9-layer 65 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 9 Quality 26 Software 19 Api 1 Frontend 15 Cicd 4
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 89.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 668 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 65 findings — concentrated in quality (21), software (16), frontend (15). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 7 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 10 of 74 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
packages/serve-sim/Sources/SimStreamHelper/AccessibilityBridge.swift:269 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
packages/serve-sim-client/src/transport.ts:160 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
packages/serve-sim-client/src/simulator/SimulatorView.tsx:198 ssrflegacy
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim-client/src/gateway.ts:161
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim-client/src/gateway.ts:161 owaspexec_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim-client/src/simulator/useSimStream.ts:69
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim-client/src/simulator/useSimStream.ts:69 owaspexec_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim-client/src/transport.ts:364
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim-client/src/transport.ts:364 owaspexec_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim/dev.ts:458
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim/dev.ts:458 owaspexec_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim/src/client/location-emulation-tool.tsx:234
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim/src/client/location-emulation-tool.tsx:234 owaspexec_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim/src/client/utils/app-icon.ts:23
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim/src/client/utils/app-icon.ts:23 owaspexec_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/serve-sim/src/client/utils/drop.ts:69
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/serve-sim/src/client/utils/drop.ts:69 owaspexec_used
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
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