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rust-unofficial/awesome-rust

https://github.com/rust-unofficial/awesome-rust · scanned 2026-06-05 09:56 UTC (5 days, 14 hours ago) · 10 languages

46 raw signals (24 security + 22 graph) System graph score 84 (lower by 10)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 5 days, 14 hours ago · v2 · 16 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 19 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 90.0 0.15 13.50
security_score 74.0 0.25 18.50
testing_score 70.0 0.20 14.00
documentation_score 75.0 0.15 11.25
practices_score 77.0 0.15 11.55
code_quality 50.0 0.10 5.00
Overall 1.00 73.8
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Quality grade B (74/100). Dimensions: security 74, maintainability 90. 24 findings (23 security). 976 lines analyzed.

Showing 14 of 16 actionable findings. 35 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 2 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow
Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.
lines 40, 41
.github/workflows/rust.yml:40, 41 (2 hits)
CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 atty: RUSTSEC-2021-0145
Potential unaligned read
Cargo.lock
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 atty: RUSTSEC-2024-0375
`atty` is unmaintained
Cargo.lock
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 chrono: RUSTSEC-2020-0159
Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations
Cargo.lock
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 dotenv: RUSTSEC-2021-0141
dotenv is Unmaintained
Cargo.lock
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 6 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `mheap/automatic-approve-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v1.1.0` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
4 files, 6 locations
.github/workflows/approve.yml:12 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/lint.yml:30 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/pr_tidyup.yml:14
.github/workflows/rust.yml:22
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 13 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
3 files, 13 locations
.github/workflows/lint.yml:17, 28, 37, 38 (7 hits)
.github/workflows/rust.yml:17, 24, 44 (5 hits)
.github/workflows/pr_tidyup.yml:10
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@master` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
2 files, 2 locations
.github/workflows/pr_tidyup.yml:11
.github/workflows/rust.yml:18
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 rsa: RUSTSEC-2023-0071
Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels
Cargo.lock
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 time: RUSTSEC-2020-0071
Potential segfault in the time crate
Cargo.lock
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 yaml-rust: RUSTSEC-2024-0320
yaml-rust is unmaintained.
Cargo.lock
medium Security checks quality Quality Average file size is 976 lines (recommend <300)
Refactor large files by extracting related functions into separate modules. Target files with 300+ lines first. Use the Single Responsibility Principle — each module should have one clear purpose.
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 1 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
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