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openops-cloud/openops

https://github.com/openops-cloud/openops · scanned 2026-05-16 12:50 UTC (1 day, 9 hours ago) · 10 languages

259 findings (9 legacy + 250 scanner) 2/10 scanners ran 95th percentile · Typescript · large (100-500K LoC) Scanner says 56 (higher by 29)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 3 days, 1 hour ago · v1 · 253 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
68.7
/100
Repobility
82
3 legacy
9-layer
56
100.0% cov · 250 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 10 Medium 34 Low 161 Source: Legacy 3 9-layer 250 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 53 Frontend 82 Network 1 Hardware 5 Security 9 Cicd 38 Quality 15 Api 50
Scan summary Repository scanned at 55.8/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 7818 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 250 findings — concentrated in frontend (82), software (50), api (50). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 7 high, 34 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 3 of 253 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
packages/server/api/src/app/slack/slack-interaction-module.ts:146 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
packages/ui-components/src/components/json-viewer/json-viewer-hook.ts:97 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
packages/ui-components/src/components/custom/markdown.tsx:50 ssrflegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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