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zetsu0000/A-getfocusroute

https://github.com/zetsu0000/A-getfocusroute · scanned 2026-06-16 01:12 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

34 raw signals (0 security + 34 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 33 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 33 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 4 Medium 19 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 33 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 4 Security 8 Cicd 1 Quality 19

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 69.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 992 nodes across 24 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 34 findings — concentrated in quality (19), security (8), frontend (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 4 high, 19 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 29 of 33 actionable findings. 34 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md:65 SecretsClaude instruction

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .continue/skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.continue/skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md:65 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .windsurf/skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.windsurf/skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md:65 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/upgrade-stripe/SKILL.md:65 SecretsSkill file

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/analytics/AnalyticsProvider.tsx:47

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/analytics/GoogleTagManager.tsx:27

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/analytics/MicrosoftClarity.tsx:23

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/seo/SchemaMarkup.tsx:92

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/subscription/SubscriptionScreen.tsx:119

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/upsell/__tests__/upsellStructure.test.ts:87

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/stripe-best-practices/references/payments.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/skills/stripe-best-practices/references/payments.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md

.claude/skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .continue/skills/stripe-best-practices/references/payments.md

.continue/skills/stripe-best-practices/references/payments.md VerificationAgent instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .continue/skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md

.continue/skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .windsurf/skills/stripe-best-practices/references/payments.md

.windsurf/skills/stripe-best-practices/references/payments.md VerificationAgent instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .windsurf/skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md

.windsurf/skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md

skills/stripe-best-practices/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/analytics/AnalyticsProvider.tsx:47

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/analytics/AnalyticsProvider.tsx:47 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/analytics/GoogleTagManager.tsx:27

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/analytics/GoogleTagManager.tsx:27 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/analytics/MicrosoftClarity.tsx:23

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/analytics/MicrosoftClarity.tsx:23 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/seo/SchemaMarkup.tsx:92

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/seo/SchemaMarkup.tsx:92 Dangerous innerhtml

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 8 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `ANALYZE`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_UI_MEMBERSHIP_ANNUAL_USD`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_UI_MEMBERSHIP_MONTHLY_USD`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_UI_PAYWALL_ANCHOR_USD`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_UI_PAYWALL_USD`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_UI_UPSELL_ANCHOR_USD`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_UI_UPSELL_USD`, `NODE_ENV`. Add them (wi…

config drift

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 14, 17

.github/workflows/ci.yml:14, 17 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

28 tests / 142 src (ratio 0.20).

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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