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shriramks/haku

https://github.com/shriramks/haku · scanned 2026-06-16 00:11 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

32 raw signals (0 security + 32 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 32 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
86.8
/100
Security checks
87
0 findings
System graph
87
88.9% cov · 32 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 11 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 32 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 9 Data 1 Security 1 Cicd 1 Quality 19
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 86.8/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 713 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 32 findings — concentrated in quality (19), frontend (9), api (1). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 17 of 32 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/layout.tsx:45
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/api/gold-price/route.ts:10
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/bands/BandsClient.tsx:80
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/nse.ts:33
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/screener.ts:39
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — public/sw.js:55
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/layout.tsx:45
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/layout.tsx:45 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph data Coverage conf 1.00 ORM models found but no DB engine detected
The repo defines tables/models but no DB connection string was found. Likely lives in env vars or a config file the scanner didn't read.
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 49 placeholder/mock markers across 14 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — app/transactions/TransactionsClient.tsx:494
A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label
Fq button no label
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
20 tests / 102 src (ratio 0.20).
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: app/transactions/TransactionsClient.tsx (1302 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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