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meyayl/docker-languagetool

https://github.com/meyayl/docker-languagetool · scanned 2026-06-05 21:06 UTC (4 days, 11 hours ago) · 10 languages

34 raw signals (18 security + 16 graph) 86th percentile · Go · tiny (<2K LoC) System graph score 88 (lower by 7)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 4 days, 11 hours ago · v2 · 18 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 8 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 55.0 0.15 8.25
security_score 88.7 0.25 22.18
testing_score 80.0 0.20 16.00
documentation_score 78.0 0.15 11.70
practices_score 99.0 0.15 14.85
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 81.0
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Quality grade A- (81/100). Dimensions: security 89, maintainability 55. 18 findings (9 security). 1,966 lines analyzed.

Showing 12 of 18 actionable findings. 26 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 9 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow
Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.
2 files, 9 locations
.github/workflows/pipeline.yaml:132, 133, 386, 387, 416, 417, 449 (7 hits)
.github/workflows/claude.yaml:80, 165 (2 hits)
CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.94 Compose service `languagetool` image uses the latest tag
The latest tag is mutable and can change without a code review, producing different images from the same source.
docker-compose.yml:2 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Docker images run as root unless the image or Dockerfile switches to a non-root user.
Dockerfile.fasttext:195 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Docker images run as root unless the image or Dockerfile switches to a non-root user.
Dockerfile:172 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/pipeline.yaml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/claude.yaml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 .dockerignore misses sensitive defaults
.dockerignore exists but does not cover common secret or VCS patterns.
.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.56 Compose service does not declare a runtime user
If the image does not define USER internally, this service may run as root.
docker-compose.yml:2 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.62 Compose service lacks no-new-privileges hardening
no-new-privileges prevents processes from gaining additional privileges through setuid binaries or file capabilities.
docker-compose.yml:2 CI/CD securitycontainers
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:${GO_VERSION}
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:162 containersPinned dependencies
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