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quansenB/FF-Positionierungstool

https://github.com/quansenB/FF-Positionierungstool · scanned 2026-06-15 23:43 UTC (2 months, 4 weeks ago)

28 raw signals (0 security + 28 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 4 weeks ago · v1 · 28 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
88.4
/100
Security checks
88
0 findings
System graph
88
88.9% cov · 28 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 20 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 28 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Security 13 Cicd 1 Quality 13
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 88.4/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 1110 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 28 findings — concentrated in security (13), quality (13), api (1). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 20 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 28 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/organisms/FbPixel/FbPixel.tsx:58
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/phoneValidation.ts:53
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in branding/funnelcockpit/funnel-36spMwXeGcqWd4BHS.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
branding/funnelcockpit/funnel-36spMwXeGcqWd4BHS.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in branding/funnelcockpit/funnel-9EGAsTHkQdaNB7NMv.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
branding/funnelcockpit/funnel-9EGAsTHkQdaNB7NMv.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in branding/funnelcockpit/funnel-H5YpSLqceEvFLG83S.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
branding/funnelcockpit/funnel-H5YpSLqceEvFLG83S.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/dbo-funnel_funnel-H5YpSLqceEvFLG83S.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/dbo-funnel_funnel-H5YpSLqceEvFLG83S.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-36spMwXeGcqWd4BHS.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-36spMwXeGcqWd4BHS.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-9EGAsTHkQdaNB7NMv.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-9EGAsTHkQdaNB7NMv.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-H5YpSLqceEvFLG83S.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-H5YpSLqceEvFLG83S.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-p37xcSRkorAppgjj8.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/funnel-p37xcSRkorAppgjj8.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/account-manager/funnel-FQCAWm5LtedQ5Nyb7.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/account-manager/funnel-FQCAWm5LtedQ5Nyb7.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/closer/funnel-NoqHxaEJfgS2FnQuf.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/closer/funnel-NoqHxaEJfgS2FnQuf.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/head-of-sales/funnel-9EGAsTHkQdaNB7NMv.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/head-of-sales/funnel-9EGAsTHkQdaNB7NMv.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/setter/funnel-36spMwXeGcqWd4BHS.json:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
funnelcockpit-exports/karriere/setter/funnel-36spMwXeGcqWd4BHS.json:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 43 placeholder/mock markers across 14 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 25 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `ACCOUNT_REVENUE_CONSULTANT_BEWERBUNG_WEBHOOK_URL`, `AGENCY_UNLOCKED_WEBHOOK_URL`, `ANGEBOTE_100K_WEBHOOK_URL`, `BACK_OFFICE_MANAGER_BEWERBUNG_WEBHOOK_URL`, `CI`, `CLOSER_BEWERBUNG_WEBHOOK_URL`, `FB_PIXEL_ID`, `FB_PIXEL_ID_KARRIERE` + 17 more. Add …
config drift
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 7 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
37 tests / 260 src (ratio 0.14).
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
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