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wujun4code/clashforge

https://github.com/wujun4code/clashforge · scanned 2026-06-16 01:01 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

96 raw signals (0 security + 96 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 49 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 47 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
42.0
/100
Security checks
42
0 findings
System graph
42
77.8% cov · 49 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 16 Low 18 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 49 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 13 Hardware 8 Security 3 Cicd 3 Quality 22
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 42.0/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 1133 nodes across 28 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 96 findings — concentrated in cicd (50), quality (22), frontend (13). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 25 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 32 of 49 actionable findings. 96 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — openwrt/files/www/luci-static/resources/view/clashforge/main.js:297
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — ui/src/api/client.ts:5
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — ui/src/components/CFConfig.tsx:82
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — ui/src/pages/Dashboard.tsx:1265
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — ui/src/pages/Nodes.tsx:2194
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: tests/docker/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Frontend route `/geodata` has no Link/navigate to it — ui/src/App.tsx
The route is registered but no `<Link to=…>` or `navigate(…)` in the codebase navigates here. Either it's reachable only via direct URL (intentional), it's dead, or the link broke during a refactor.
Orphan pageWiring
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 6 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
subosito/flutter-action@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
3 files, 6 locations
.github/workflows/android-ci.yml:113, 169, 289 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/android-release.yml:65, 240 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:572
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
5 files, 5 locations
.github/workflows/android-release.yml
.github/workflows/auto-merge.yml
.github/workflows/auto-tag.yml
.github/workflows/pages.yml
.github/workflows/release.yml
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in internal/api/middleware.go:32
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
internal/api/middleware.go:32 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in openwrt/files/www/luci-static/resources/view/clashforge/main.js:295
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
openwrt/files/www/luci-static/resources/view/clashforge/main.js:295 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/build_ipk.py:122
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 212 placeholder/mock markers across 38 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 20 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: alpine:3.19
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:49 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:1.25-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:19 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:4 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 39 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/setup-go@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
7 files, 39 locations
.github/workflows/release.yml:56, 92, 115, 162, 203, 221, 310, 357, +5 more (13 hits)
.github/workflows/e2e-openwrt.yml:58, 61, 67, 189, 197, 214, 272, 389 (8 hits)
.github/workflows/e2e-node-server.yml:45, 48, 54, 83, 100, 104 (6 hits)
.github/workflows/pages.yml:25, 28, 45, 51, 64 (5 hits)
.github/workflows/android-ci.yml:60, 106, 162, 181 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/android-release.yml:53, 59 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/ios-ci.yml:127
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
30 tests / 159 src (ratio 0.19).
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: internal/api/handler_overview.go (2191 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: scripts/clashforgectl.sh (1582 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: ui/src/pages/Dashboard.tsx (1626 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: ui/src/pages/Nodes.tsx (3160 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: ui/src/pages/PerDeviceRules.tsx (2273 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: ui/src/pages/Publish.tsx (2352 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: ui/src/pages/QuickStart.tsx (1358 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: ui/src/pages/Setup.tsx (3040 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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