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Timmyy3000/argus

https://github.com/Timmyy3000/argus · scanned 2026-06-16 00:36 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

20 raw signals (0 security + 20 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 20 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 20 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 1 High 3 Medium 6 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 20 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 3 Hardware 3 Security 3 Cicd 1 Quality 5 Api 5

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.8/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 387 nodes across 12 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 20 findings — concentrated in quality (5), api (5), frontend (3). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 3 high, 6 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 17 of 20 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/attempt-smoke.ts

Detected pattern matching openai_or_anthropic_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

scripts/attempt-smoke.ts:55

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: DELETE /api/standards/skills/${id} (web/src/api.ts:65)

`web/src/api.ts:65` calls `DELETE /api/standards/skills/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/standards/skills/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matche…

Dangling fetchHelper:request

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /jobs/${id} (web/src/api.ts:57)

`web/src/api.ts:57` calls `GET /jobs/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/jobs/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.

Dangling fetchHelper:request

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: PUT /api/standards/skills/${id} (web/src/api.ts:64)

`web/src/api.ts:64` calls `PUT /api/standards/skills/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/standards/skills/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher s…

Dangling fetchHelper:request

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/pg-boss-smoke.ts:14

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/api.ts:37

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/codex/device-auth.ts:1

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/codex/device-auth.ts:1 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/system/command.ts:1

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/system/command.ts:1 Node child process

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: oven/bun:1

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/attempt-smoke.ts:79

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/pg-boss-smoke.ts:26

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/deliveries

`src/http/setup-routes.ts` declares `GET /api/deliveries` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /webhooks/github

`src/http/github-routes.ts` declares `POST /webhooks/github` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

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