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seraphimmgmt/Snapchat-editor

https://github.com/seraphimmgmt/Snapchat-editor · scanned 2026-06-16 00:07 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

29 raw signals (0 security + 29 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 26 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 3 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
68.8
/100
Security checks
69
0 findings
System graph
69
88.9% cov · 26 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 9 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 26 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 7 Frontend 1 Security 4 Cicd 4 Quality 9 Api 1
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.8/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 110 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 29 findings — concentrated in quality (9), software (7), cicd (7). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 26 actionable findings. 29 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `render` without auth dependency — infra/render-server/main.py:373
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
infra/render-server/main.py:373 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 34, 39
.github/workflows/release.yml:34, 39 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/refresh-ios-pool.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in infra/render-server/main.py:54
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
infra/render-server/main.py:54 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in mockups/theme-cyberpunk.html:1820
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
mockups/theme-cyberpunk.html:1820 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in mockups/trending-tab.html:556
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
mockups/trending-tab.html:556 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 6 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 13 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 34, 41, 59
.github/workflows/refresh-ios-pool.yml:34, 41, 59 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `_purge_old` in infra/render-server/main.py:63
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_dramatic_cool
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:112
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_dramatic_warm
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:108
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_mono
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:75
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_noir
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:85
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_silvertone
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:80
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_vivid_cool
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:99
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lut_vivid_warm
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
infra/render-server/build_luts.py:95
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /render
`infra/render-server/main.py` declares `POST /render` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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