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tt-a1i/lore

https://github.com/tt-a1i/lore · scanned 2026-06-16 00:42 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

26 raw signals (0 security + 26 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 26 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
82.5
/100
Security checks
83
0 findings
System graph
83
77.8% cov · 26 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 17 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 26 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Security 12 Cicd 1 Quality 11
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 82.5/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 654 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 26 findings — concentrated in security (12), quality (11), frontend (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 26 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — test/viewer/server.test.ts:183
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in site/lore-site.js:35
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
site/lore-site.js:35 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/viewer/ui/intro.ts:194
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/viewer/ui/intro.ts:194 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/viewer/ui/shell.ts:293
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/viewer/ui/shell.ts:293 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/viewer/ui/view-decisions.ts:295
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/viewer/ui/view-decisions.ts:295 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/viewer/ui/view-graph.ts:822
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/viewer/ui/view-graph.ts:822 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/viewer/ui/view-map.ts:284
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/viewer/ui/view-map.ts:284 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/viewer/ui/view-story.ts:257
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/viewer/ui/view-story.ts:257 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/distill/claude-cli.ts:17
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/distill/claude-cli.ts:17 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/git/history.ts:27
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/git/history.ts:27 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/mcp/server.ts:22
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/mcp/server.ts:22 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/why/engine.ts:23
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/why/engine.ts:23 Node child process
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 86 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — src/cli.ts:627
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — test/parsers/opencode.test.ts:398
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/cli.ts (2468 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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