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sufficit/sufficit-vscode-symposium

https://github.com/sufficit/sufficit-vscode-symposium · scanned 2026-06-16 00:24 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

21 raw signals (0 security + 21 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 21 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
71.9
/100
Security checks
72
0 findings
System graph
72
77.8% cov · 21 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 15 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 21 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 8 Cicd 3 Quality 9
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 71.9/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 348 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 21 findings — concentrated in quality (9), security (8), cicd (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 19 of 21 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/adapters/openai.ts:363
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/auth/identity.ts:66
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/sync/hubClient.ts:98
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
softprops/action-gh-release@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build.yml:46 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/build.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/chatHtml.ts:843
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/chatHtml.ts:843 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/configHtml.ts:120
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/configHtml.ts:120 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/adapters/claude.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/adapters/claude.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/adapters/codex.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/adapters/codex.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/adapters/copilot.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/adapters/copilot.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/adapters/scrub.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/adapters/scrub.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/extension.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/extension.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/git.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/git.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 16 placeholder/mock markers across 4 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/upload-artifact@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build.yml:38 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
4 tests / 33 src (ratio 0.12).
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/ui/chatHtml.ts (2521 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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