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alireza0/s-ui

https://github.com/alireza0/s-ui.git · scanned 2026-05-21 16:00 UTC (3 weeks, 1 day ago) · 10 languages

178 raw signals (86 security + 92 graph) 30th percentile · Go · small (2-20K LoC) System graph score 67 (lower by 3)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 3 weeks, 1 day ago · v2 · 60 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 71 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 100.0 0.15 15.00
security_score 73.4 0.25 18.35
testing_score 0.0 0.20 0.00
documentation_score 75.0 0.15 11.25
practices_score 79.0 0.15 11.85
code_quality 75.3 0.10 7.53
Overall 1.00 64.0
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Quality grade C+ (64/100). Dimensions: security 73, maintainability 100. 86 findings (44 security). 11,072 lines analyzed.

Showing 41 of 60 actionable findings. 131 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC096] Rails: SQL injection via where("#{...}") or find_by_sql: ActiveRecord where() / find_by_sql with interpolation enables SQL injection. Concept from Brakeman check_sql — re-authored from OWASP CWE-89.
Use parameterized form: `.where("name = ?", user_input)` or named placeholders.
service/config.go:270
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in install.sh
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
install.sh:92
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in s-ui.sh
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
s-ui.sh:146
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: GET /:subid.
A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: GET /:subid.
sub/subHandler.go:23
high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC088] Go: TLS InsecureSkipVerify=true: tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify:true} disables certificate verification — MITM risk. Ported from gosec G402 (Apache-2.0).
Remove the option. If self-signed certs are required, pin via RootCAs.
util/subToJson.go:16
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Dockerfile FROM `golang:1.26-alpine` not pinned by digest
`FROM golang:1.26-alpine` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.
Dockerfile:5
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Dockerfile FROM `golang:1.26-alpine` not pinned by digest
`FROM golang:1.26-alpine` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.
Dockerfile.frontend-artifact:1
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 46 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6.0.2` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
3 files, 46 locations
.github/workflows/docker.yml:13, 17, 26, 45, 47, 71, 108, 120 (16 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:32, 38, 52, 74, 77, 83, 110, 185 (16 hits)
.github/workflows/windows.yml:30, 36, 49, 67, 70, 76, 123 (14 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
medium Security checks security auth conf 0.92 [AUC001] No Repobility access matrix policy found: The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
high Security checks security auth conf 0.74 [AUC002] Low visible authorization coverage in route inventory: Only 6.1% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
Only 6.1% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /:getAction.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /:getAction.
api/apiV2Handler.go:36
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /allowInsecure.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /allowInsecure.
util/linkToJson.go:538
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /alpn.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /alpn.
util/linkToJson.go:540
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /disable_sni.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /disable_sni.
util/linkToJson.go:542
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /ech.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /ech.
util/linkToJson.go:541
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /fp.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /fp.
util/linkToJson.go:536
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /insecure.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /insecure.
util/linkToJson.go:539
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /sni.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /sni.
util/linkToJson.go:537
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /Token.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /Token.
api/apiV2Handler.go:99
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /:postAction.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /:postAction.
api/apiV2Handler.go:35
medium Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC123] Production stack trace / debug output exposed: Debug mode left on in production exposes stack traces, environment variables, framework internals — sometimes triggers RCE (Django debug page with arbitrary template eval).
Set DEBUG=False / APP_DEBUG=false in production. Provide a generic 500 handler that logs to backend but returns a sanitized page to clients.
runSUI.sh:2
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Docker images run as root unless the image or Dockerfile switches to a non-root user.
Dockerfile.frontend-artifact:36 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Docker images run as root unless the image or Dockerfile switches to a non-root user.
Dockerfile:41 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.76 Dockerfile copies broad context with incomplete .dockerignore
COPY . or ADD . is safer when .dockerignore excludes secrets, git history, keys, and generated artifacts.
Dockerfile.frontend-artifact:28 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.76 Dockerfile copies broad context with incomplete .dockerignore
COPY . or ADD . is safer when .dockerignore excludes secrets, git history, keys, and generated artifacts.
Dockerfile:33 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.70 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell
Agent helper projects often publish one-line installers. `curl | sh` style commands are convenient, but they bypass review unless the script is pinned, signed, or checksum-verified.
s-ui.sh:472
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.70 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell
Agent helper projects often publish one-line installers. `curl | sh` style commands are convenient, but they bypass review unless the script is pinned, signed, or checksum-verified.
README.md:122
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:40 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 14 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/metadata-action@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
3 files, 14 locations
.github/workflows/docker.yml:57, 67, 69, 78, 83, 90, 126, 131, +2 more (10 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:192 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/windows.yml:130 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 73 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 .dockerignore misses sensitive defaults
.dockerignore exists but does not cover common secret or VCS patterns.
.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers
low Security checks security auth conf 0.76 [AUC005] No authorization-focused tests detected: No test files with common authorization, ownership, 403, admin, or super_admin assertions were found.
No test files with common authorization, ownership, 403, admin, or super_admin assertions were found.
low Security checks quality Error handling conf 1.00 3 occurrences [ERR003] Ignored Error (Go): Ignoring error return values.
Handle the error or use errcheck linter.
3 files, 3 locations
api/utils.go:34
database/backup.go:47
database/model/endpoints.go:31
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.56 Compose service does not declare a runtime user
If the image does not define USER internally, this service may run as root.
docker-compose.yml:19 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.62 Compose service lacks no-new-privileges hardening
no-new-privileges prevents processes from gaining additional privileges through setuid binaries or file capabilities.
docker-compose.yml:19 CI/CD securitycontainers
low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.60 4 occurrences Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicate implementation blocks are maintenance debt. Keep them visible, but they are not a high-severity defect unless the duplicated logic is security-sensitive or drifting.
4 files, 4 locations
api/apiV2Handler.go:54
database/model/outbounds.go:10
database/model/services.go:14
web/web.go:32
duplicationquality
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:1.26-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:5 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
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