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GenericAgent

https://github.com/lsdefine/GenericAgent.git · scanned 2026-05-17 02:55 UTC (13 hours, 27 minutes ago) · 10 languages

232 findings (24 legacy + 208 scanner) 55th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 82 (lower by 28)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 13 hours, 27 minutes ago · v2 · 129 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
75.1
/100
Repobility
68
24 legacy
9-layer
82
100.0% cov · 105 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 27 Medium 17 Low 80 Source: Legacy 24 9-layer 105 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 54 Security 18 Software 33 Frontend 3 Data 1 Cicd 1 Api 19
Scan summary Repository scanned at 82.3/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1452 nodes across 18 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 105 findings — concentrated in quality (42), software (28), api (19). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 13 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 129 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.
Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.
agentmain.py:208 path_traversallegacy
high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.
Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.
memory/vision_api.template.py:55 path_traversallegacy
high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.
Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.
memory/ocr_utils.py:52 path_traversallegacy
high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 0.85 [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting.
Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs.
assets/configure_mykey.py:939 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 0.85 [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting.
Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs.
llmcore.py:168 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy software xxe conf 1.00 [SEC027] XML External Entity (XXE) — Node.js xml parsers: Node.js XML parsers can expand external entities if not configured. libxmljs in particular has had XXE CVEs.
Pass `noent: false` to libxmljs. Avoid xml2js or pass explicit secure config. Prefer parsers that don't expand external entities at all.
frontends/stapp2.py:837 xxelegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
llmcore.py:105 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
frontends/desktop/static/app.js:1885 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
TMWebDriver.py:17 ssrflegacy
high Legacy security llm_injection conf 0.82 LLM memory extraction can be prompt-injected into storing fake facts
Strict-JSON memory extraction from raw user and assistant text can be manipulated by a user message unless extracted facts are schema-validated and filtered before persistence.
frontends/qtapp.py:448 llm_injectionlegacy
high Legacy quality testing No test files found
Add a test directory (tests/ or __tests__/) with unit tests for core functionality. Use pytest (Python), Jest (JS/TS), or go test (Go). Start with tests for critical business logic and security-sensitive functions.
testinglegacy
high 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Blocking `requests.post(...)` inside `async def _get_access_token` — frontends/dingtalkapp.py:35
Sync I/O inside an async function blocks the event loop. While `requests.post(...)` is running, *all* other coroutines on this loop are paused — silent throughput collapse under concurrency. Use the async equivalent (`httpx.AsyncClient`, `asyncio.sleep`, `aiofiles`) or wrap with `await asyncio.to_t…
frontends/dingtalkapp.py:35 integritysync-io-in-asyncperformance
high 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Blocking `requests.post(...)` inside `async def _send_batch_message` — frontends/dingtalkapp.py:66
Sync I/O inside an async function blocks the event loop. While `requests.post(...)` is running, *all* other coroutines on this loop are paused — silent throughput collapse under concurrency. Use the async equivalent (`httpx.AsyncClient`, `asyncio.sleep`, `aiofiles`) or wrap with `await asyncio.to_t…
frontends/dingtalkapp.py:66 integritysync-io-in-asyncperformance
high 9-layer api wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET http://127.0.0.1:18765 (assets/tmwd_cdp_bridge/background.js:220)
`assets/tmwd_cdp_bridge/background.js:220` calls `GET http://127.0.0.1:18765` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/http:/127.0.0.1:18765` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the…
wiringdangling-fetchfetch
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `api_chat` without auth dependency — frontends/conductor.py:390
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
frontends/conductor.py:390 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `api_start_subagent` without auth dependency — frontends/conductor.py:346
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
frontends/conductor.py:346 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `api_subagent_action` without auth dependency — frontends/conductor.py:352
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
frontends/conductor.py:352 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_post` without auth dependency — assets/agent_bbs.py:157
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
assets/agent_bbs.py:157 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `startup` without auth dependency — assets/agent_bbs.py:145
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
assets/agent_bbs.py:145 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `upload_file` without auth dependency — assets/agent_bbs.py:195
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
assets/agent_bbs.py:195 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in assets/tmwd_cdp_bridge/background.js:177
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
assets/tmwd_cdp_bridge/background.js:177 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in frontends/desktop/src-tauri/src/lib.rs:282
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
frontends/desktop/src-tauri/src/lib.rs:282 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in ga.py:300
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
ga.py:300 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in ga.py:301
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
ga.py:301 owaspexec_used
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
frontends/continue_cmd.py:171 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
frontends/fsapp.py:704 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
frontends/qqapp.py:40 error_handlinglegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
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