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blackstarzck/topik-project-v13

https://github.com/blackstarzck/topik-project-v13 · scanned 2026-06-17 01:41 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

62 raw signals (0 security + 62 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ +7.3 (diff) · 61 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 61 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 9 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 61 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 6 Security 2 Cicd 1 Quality 52

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 84.0/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 2377 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 62 findings — concentrated in quality (52), frontend (6), security (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 14 of 61 actionable findings. 62 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/app/api/notifications/dispatch-email/route.ts:8

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/app/auth/callback/route.ts:38

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/dynamic-workflow-generator/SKILL.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/skills/dynamic-workflow-generator/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .codex/skills/dynamic-workflow-generator/SKILL.md

.codex/skills/dynamic-workflow-generator/SKILL.md VerificationCodex instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md

CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in landing.html:564

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

landing.html:564 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/i18n/scan-unmigrated.mjs:10

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/i18n/scan-unmigrated.mjs:10 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 50 placeholder/mock markers across 29 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 15 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `AI_BUILD_PREFLIGHT_FORCE`, `E2E_BASE_URL`, `NODE_ENV`, `NOTIFICATION_WORKER_SECRET`, `RESEND_API_KEY`, `RESEND_FROM`, `RS_LABEL`, `RS_ORIGIN` + 7 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.

config drift

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 16 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 19, 22

.github/workflows/ci.yml:19, 22 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — tests/e2e/flows/core-writing-flow.spec.ts:55

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

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