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sebastianpg12/FrontendGemsCRM

https://github.com/sebastianpg12/FrontendGemsCRM · scanned 2026-06-16 00:06 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

72 raw signals (0 security + 72 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 67 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 67 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 28 Low 30 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 67 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 8 Security 17 Cicd 3 Quality 15 Api 24

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 54.3/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 578 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 72 findings — concentrated in api (24), security (17), quality (15). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 29 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 57 of 67 actionable findings. 72 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Runtime dotenv file present in repo: .env.development

`.env.development` looks like a runtime dotenv file. No high-confidence secret value was matched, but runtime dotenv files often drift into live credentials. Move real values to a secret manager and keep only `.env.example` style templates in source control.

.env.development ConfigEnv fileRuntime env

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/authHeaders.ts:29

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/chatService.ts:187

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/reportsOverviewService.ts:50

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/ticketService.ts:27

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/userService.ts:145

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md

CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 2 locations

.github/workflows/deploy.yml:41

.github/workflows/main_crmcustomertouch.yml:39

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in gems-costos-demo.html:256