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Totocabal/decrypto-newsletter

https://github.com/Totocabal/decrypto-newsletter · scanned 2026-06-16 00:40 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

54 raw signals (0 security + 54 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 54 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Security checks

100.0% cov · 54 findings

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 27 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 54 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 9 Security 11 Cicd 1 Quality 32

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.1/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 831 nodes across 7 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 54 findings — concentrated in quality (32), security (11), frontend (9). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 27 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 34 of 54 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/SectionEditor.jsx:803

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — api/gemini.js:267

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — api/generate-crm-brief.js:379

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — api/generate-markdown-import.js:698

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — api/preview-html.js:139

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/EditorPanel.jsx:130

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/pages/EditorPage.jsx:411

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/pages/NewslettersListPage.jsx:920

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/gemini.js:245

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

api/gemini.js:245 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/generate-crm-brief.js:348

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

api/generate-crm-brief.js:348 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/generate-markdown-import.js:679

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

api/generate-markdown-import.js:679 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/import-markdown.js:217

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

api/import-markdown.js:217 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/send-preview.js:122

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

api/send-preview.js:122 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/SectionEditor.jsx:803

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/SectionEditor.jsx:803 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in api/preview-html.js:788

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

api/preview-html.js:788 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/EditorPanel.jsx:63

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/EditorPanel.jsx:63 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/SectionEditor.jsx:338

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/SectionEditor.jsx:338 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/pages/NewslettersListPage.jsx:1373

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/pages/NewslettersListPage.jsx:1373 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in api/preview-html.js:955

Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.

api/preview-html.js:955 Local storage auth token

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 85 placeholder/mock markers across 11 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

1 test file(s) for 56 source file(s) (ratio 0.02). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 8 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `BRAZE_REST_ENDPOINT`, `PUPPETEER_EXECUTABLE_PATH`, `RESEND_API_KEY`, `RESEND_FROM`, `RESEND_FROM_EMAIL`, `SUPABASE_ANON_KEY`, `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, `SUPABASE_URL`. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't …

config drift

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/components/SectionEditor.jsx (3116 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/pages/AdminPage.jsx (2202 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/pages/NewslettersListPage.jsx (3092 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/render/buildEmail.js (1923 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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