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InspectorHub/OpenInspection

https://github.com/InspectorHub/OpenInspection · scanned 2026-06-16 04:28 UTC (2 months ago)

17 raw signals (0 security + 17 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months ago · v1 · 17 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 17 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 6 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 17 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 2 Security 1 Cicd 2 Quality 11

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 78.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 215 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 17 findings — concentrated in quality (11), frontend (2), cicd (2). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 6 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 12 of 17 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in worker-configuration.d.ts:2977

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

worker-configuration.d.ts:2977 Exec used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — eslint.config.js:55

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — worker-configuration.d.ts:324

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `certIssuerDNLegacy` in worker-configuration.d.ts:10427

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — worker-configuration.d.ts:191

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: worker-configuration.d.ts (12841 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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