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wikieden/clihub

https://github.com/wikieden/clihub · scanned 2026-06-16 00:57 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

43 raw signals (0 security + 43 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 41 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 41 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 28 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 41 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Hardware 3 Security 20 Cicd 2 Quality 14

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 56.1/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 874 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 43 findings — concentrated in security (20), quality (14), cicd (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 30 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 38 of 41 actionable findings. 43 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/cli/src/cli.ts:88

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

packages/cli/src/cli.ts:88 Exec used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — clihub-desktop/src/lib/daemon.ts:56

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/core/src/auth/login.ts:52

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/core/src/sync/transport.ts:76

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/daemon/test/entrypoint.test.ts:41

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: packages/catalog/mcp.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

packages/catalog/mcp.json VerificationMcp config

medium System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction contains unpinned remote install: packages/skill/SKILL.md

Remote install commands in agent instructions are a supply-chain risk, especially when an agent can execute shell commands.

packages/skill/SKILL.md:71 Supply chainSkill file

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

docker/metadata-action@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/docker.yml:57, 66 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/release.yml:75

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in packages/cli/src/daemon-ctl.ts:13