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Nutlope/hallmark

https://github.com/Nutlope/hallmark · scanned 2026-07-23 19:39 UTC (4 days, 19 hours ago)

19 raw signals (0 security + 19 graph)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 4 days, 19 hours ago · v7 · 19 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 42.0/100 with 30.0% coverage. It contains 368 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 19 findings — concentrated in security (12), quality (7). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 5 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 18 of 19 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Skillspector conf 0.90 SkillSpector P1 (prompt-injection) in skills/hallmark/SKILL.md
override system This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended. Skill: hallmark Rule: P1 Category: prompt-injection Severity: HIGH Confidence: 0.90 Remediation: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the…
skills/hallmark/SKILL.md:186 Mcp skillPrompt injectionP1
high System graph security Skillspector conf 0.70 SkillSpector P2 (prompt-injection) in skills/hallmark/references/assets.md
<!-- TODO: Replace with real <thing>, target size: <WxH> --> Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended. Skill: hallmark Rule: P2 Category: prompt-injection Severity: HIGH Confidence: 0.70 Remediation:…
skills/hallmark/references/assets.md:23 Mcp skillPrompt injectionP2
high System graph security Skillspector conf 0.70 SkillSpector P2 (prompt-injection) in skills/hallmark/references/imagery-kit.md
<!-- TODO: Replace with real product photo, target size: 600×900 --> Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended. Skill: hallmark Rule: P2 Category: prompt-injection Severity: HIGH Confidence: 0.70 Reme…
skills/hallmark/references/imagery-kit.md:131 Mcp skillPrompt injectionP2
high System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector P6 (prompt-injection) in skills/hallmark/references/export-formats.md
output rule Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties. Skill: hallmark Rule: P6 Category: prompt-injection Severity: HIGH Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, o…
skills/hallmark/references/export-formats.md:10 Mcp skillPrompt injectionP6
high System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector P6 (prompt-injection) in skills/hallmark/references/hero-enrichment.md
print rule Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties. Skill: hallmark Rule: P6 Category: prompt-injection Severity: HIGH Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or…
skills/hallmark/references/hero-enrichment.md:389 Mcp skillPrompt injectionP6
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/hallmark/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
skills/hallmark/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 0.90 Fire-and-forget `fetch()` has no rejection handler — site/js/main.js:712
This fetch result is neither awaited, returned, assigned, nor followed by `.catch(...)`. A network failure can therefore become an unhandled promise rejection. Await/return the promise or attach an explicit rejection handler.
site/js/main.js:712 runtime safetyRobustnessUnhandled promise
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.50 SkillSpector E1 (data-exfil) in skills/hallmark/references/assets.md
https://api.svgl.app/ Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended. Skill: hallmark Rule: E1 Category: data-exfil Severity: MEDIUM Confidence: 0.50 Remediation: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. …
skills/hallmark/references/assets.md:122 Mcp skillData exfilE1
medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.50 SkillSpector E1 (data-exfil) in skills/hallmark/references/typography.md
https://api.fontshare.com/ Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended. Skill: hallmark Rule: E1 Category: data-exfil Severity: MEDIUM Confidence: 0.50 Remediation: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necess…
skills/hallmark/references/typography.md:51 Mcp skillData exfilE1
medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.75 SkillSpector EA2 (excessive-agency) in skills/hallmark/references/study.md
without asking Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation. Skill: hallmark Rule: EA2 Category: excessive-agency Severity: MEDIUM…
skills/hallmark/references/study.md:455 Mcp skillExcessive agencyEa2
medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.75 SkillSpector EA2 (excessive-agency) in skills/hallmark/references/verbs/redesign.md
without confirmation Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation. Skill: hallmark Rule: EA2 Category: excessive-agency Severity: …
skills/hallmark/references/verbs/redesign.md:249 Mcp skillExcessive agencyEa2
medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.75 SkillSpector EA2 (excessive-agency) in skills/hallmark/SKILL.md
without asking Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation. Skill: hallmark Rule: EA2 Category: excessive-agency Severity: MEDIUM…
skills/hallmark/SKILL.md:518 Mcp skillExcessive agencyEa2
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 13 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `hero__copy` in site/examples/riso-01/script.js:15
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `strip__copy` in site/examples/cobalt-01/script.js:24
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
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