Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
Sign up free Scan another repo

sburdges-eng/Lariat

https://github.com/sburdges-eng/Lariat · scanned 2026-06-16 00:04 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

492 raw signals (0 security + 492 graph)

File as issue Image
UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 486 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 6 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
72.5
/100
Security checks
73
0 findings
System graph
73
100.0% cov · 486 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 53 Low 49 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 486 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 19 Api 1 Frontend 6 Network 1 Security 26 Cicd 1 Quality 432
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 6777 nodes across 1 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 492 findings — concentrated in quality (438), security (26), software (19). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 53 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 51 of 486 actionable findings. 492 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/beo/share/[token]/page.jsx:154
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/food-safety/haccp-plan/page.jsx:260
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/v2/layout.jsx:15
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/_components/LariAmbient.jsx:57
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/allergen-lookup/AllergenLookupClient.jsx:262
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/api/morning/route.js:43
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/gold-stars/GoldStarBoard.tsx:94
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/kitchen-assistant/KitchenAssistantClient.jsx:98
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/login-pin/LoginPinForm.jsx:34
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/management/performance-reviews/PerformanceReviewBoard.tsx:51
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/prep/PrepBoard.jsx:299
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/recipes/[slug]/edit/RecipeEditForm.jsx:21
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/shows/[id]/box-office/BoxOfficeBoard.jsx:42
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/shows/[id]/sound/SoundBoard.jsx:67
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/stations/[id]/StationChecklist.tsx:211
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/clientFetch.ts:78
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/syncClient.ts:36
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/syncScheduler.ts:160
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — public/design-atlas/design-canvas.jsx:117
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — public/sw.js:98
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/sevenshifts_api/client.mjs:3
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/toast_api/client.mjs:65
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CODEX.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
CODEX.md VerificationCodex instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/beo/share/[token]/page.jsx:154
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/beo/share/[token]/page.jsx:154 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/food-safety/haccp-plan/page.jsx:260
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/food-safety/haccp-plan/page.jsx:260 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/v2/layout.jsx:15
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/v2/layout.jsx:15 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in public/design-atlas/floorplan/index.html:16
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
public/design-atlas/floorplan/index.html:16 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in archive/lariat_executive_dashboard.html:815
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
archive/lariat_executive_dashboard.html:815 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/design-atlas/floorplan/index.html:15
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/design-atlas/floorplan/index.html:15 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in desktop/after-pack-ad-hoc.cjs:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
desktop/after-pack-ad-hoc.cjs:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in desktop/supervisor.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
desktop/supervisor.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in lib/devCodeSearch.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
lib/devCodeSearch.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in lib/recipeCalculator.ts:12
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
lib/recipeCalculator.ts:12 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/agent-session.mjs:3
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/agent-session.mjs:3 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/check-session-branch.mjs:15
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/check-session-branch.mjs:15 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/export.mjs:10
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/export.mjs:10 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/ingest-analytics.mjs:27
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/ingest-analytics.mjs:27 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/ingest-costing.mjs:5
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/ingest-costing.mjs:5 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/ingest-shows.mjs:17
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/ingest-shows.mjs:17 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/ingest-toast-invoices.mjs:19
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/ingest-toast-invoices.mjs:19 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/ingest.mjs:11
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/ingest.mjs:11 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/package-desktop.mjs:2
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/package-desktop.mjs:2 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/run-job.mjs:32
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/run-job.mjs:32 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/toast-weekly-ingest.mjs:41
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/toast-weekly-ingest.mjs:41 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/version-stamp.mjs:24
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/version-stamp.mjs:24 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in training/eval/run-eval.mjs:26
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
training/eval/run-eval.mjs:26 Node child process
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/schema/check-json-order.py:30
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 242 placeholder/mock markers across 89 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 42 in use
Port 42 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
scripts/demo-smoke.sh Ports
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/6f984632-92f1-4d5d-891c-1f12cf34ced8/

To check status programmatically (no auth required): 

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/6f984632-92f1-4d5d-891c-1f12cf34ced8/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.