Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
Sign up free Scan another repo

qmilab/asterism

https://github.com/qmilab/asterism · scanned 2026-06-15 23:43 UTC (2 months, 4 weeks ago)

71 raw signals (0 security + 71 graph)

File as issue Image
UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 4 weeks ago · v1 · 71 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
81.7
/100
Security checks
82
0 findings
System graph
82
88.9% cov · 71 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 3 Medium 11 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 71 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 7 Cicd 2 Quality 61
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 81.7/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 566 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 71 findings — concentrated in quality (61), security (7), cicd (2). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 3 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 71 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/core/src/db/driver.ts:19
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/core/src/db/driver.ts:19 Exec used
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/core/src/db/node-builtin-driver.ts:33
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/core/src/db/node-builtin-driver.ts:33 Exec used
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in packages/core/src/db/node-driver.ts:29
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
packages/core/src/db/node-driver.ts:29 Exec used
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/server/src/index.test.ts:326
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/server/src/serve-node.test.ts:64
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/deno-acceptance.mjs:125
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/node-acceptance.mjs:115
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing lockfile. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/docs.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in packages/cli/src/bin.ts:20
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
packages/cli/src/bin.ts:20 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/deno-acceptance.mjs:19
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/deno-acceptance.mjs:19 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/node-acceptance.mjs:14
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/node-acceptance.mjs:14 Node child process
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 10 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/deploy-pages@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/docs.yml:63 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: packages/adapter-pi/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
packages/adapter-pi/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: packages/channels/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
packages/channels/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: packages/cli/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
packages/cli/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: packages/core/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
packages/core/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: packages/reflect/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
packages/reflect/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: packages/server/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
packages/server/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — packages/cli/src/cli.test.ts:1536
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: packages/cli/src/cli.test.ts (1792 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: packages/cli/src/cli.ts (2316 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/79720f2e-0b5c-4c8f-a77c-f5de2e56b2be/

To check status programmatically (no auth required): 

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/79720f2e-0b5c-4c8f-a77c-f5de2e56b2be/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.