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YirehSA/Cardtly

https://github.com/YirehSA/Cardtly · scanned 2026-06-16 01:06 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

88 raw signals (2 security + 86 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 88 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
69.6
/100
Security checks
70
2 findings
System graph
70
88.9% cov · 86 findings
Critical
1
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 0 Medium 25 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 2 System graph 86 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 60 Security 6 Api 1 Frontend 20 Cicd 1
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 69.6/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 963 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 86 findings — concentrated in quality (59), frontend (20), security (5). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 24 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 32 of 88 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks security auth conf 0.78 Foundry mined security auth guardrail gaps: YirehSA/Cardtly
Graph query export: Security/auth changes without enough guardrails Query id: security_auth_guardrail_gaps Query type: motif_query Intent: Assumption-check security/auth examples requiring stronger tests or CI. Motif: security_auth_without_guardrails Training usage: assumption_check Graph gold labe…
medium Security checks quality Practices conf 0.62 Foundry mined assumption checks: YirehSA/Cardtly
Comment chain pattern product: assumption_checks Repo: YirehSA/Cardtly Thread: YirehSA/Cardtly#1 Outcome: claimed_resolved_unverified Thread label: thread_has_human_issue_and_fix_context Source graph label: source_backed_multi_signal_graph Reasons: source_graph_has_real_artifacts, source_graph_has_…
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/nfc/page.tsx:89
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/page.tsx:103
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — components/card/FlippableCardPreview.tsx:90
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — components/marketing/FaqSection.tsx:78
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — components/marketing/StructuredData.tsx:68
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/api/paystack/initialize/route.ts:30
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/api/team/route.ts:77
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/admin/AdminDashboard.tsx:138
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/card/CardEditor.tsx:97
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/marketing/FeaturedCards.tsx:32
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/nfc/NFCOrderPage.tsx:250
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/settings/SettingsTabs.tsx:115
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/team/TeamCardEditor.tsx:166
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — components/team/TeamDashboard.tsx:174
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/nfc/page.tsx:89
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/nfc/page.tsx:89 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/page.tsx:103
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/page.tsx:103 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in components/card/FlippableCardPreview.tsx:90
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
components/card/FlippableCardPreview.tsx:90 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in components/marketing/FaqSection.tsx:78
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
components/marketing/FaqSection.tsx:78 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in components/marketing/StructuredData.tsx:68
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
components/marketing/StructuredData.tsx:68 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 126 placeholder/mock markers across 27 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 177 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/api/webhooks/paystack/route.ts:22
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: components/admin/AdminDashboard.tsx (980 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: components/card/PublicCardView.tsx (1365 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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