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williamscchulz-was/vergara-schulz-wealthy-tracker

https://github.com/williamscchulz-was/vergara-schulz-wealthy-tracker · scanned 2026-06-16 00:58 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

47 raw signals (0 security + 47 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 42 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 51.4/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 502 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 47 findings — concentrated in security (24), quality (12), cicd (8). Risk profile is high: 7 critical, 0 high, 23 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 37 of 42 actionable findings. 47 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'private_key_in_repo' in worker/src/worker.js:308
Found a known-risky pattern (private_key_in_repo). Review and replace if possible.
worker/src/worker.js:308 Private key in repo
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in public/js/firebase.js
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
public/js/firebase.js:8
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tools/fix-historico.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
tools/fix-historico.html:339
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tools/import-historico.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
tools/import-historico.html:335
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tools/restore-equity.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
tools/restore-equity.html:64
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tools/seed-history.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
tools/seed-history.html:61
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tools/seed.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
tools/seed.html:54
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — public/js/app.js:3666
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — worker/src/worker.js:54
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing lockfile. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
FirebaseExtended/action-hosting-deploy@v0 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/firebase-hosting.yml:42 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/pages.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in CLAUDE.md:55
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
CLAUDE.md:55 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in worker/src/worker.js:24
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
worker/src/worker.js:24 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/despesas-mockup.html:298
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/despesas-mockup.html:298 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/import-anim-preview.html:211
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/import-anim-preview.html:211 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/invest-mockup-dark.html:209
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/invest-mockup-dark.html:209 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/invest-mockup.html:211
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/invest-mockup.html:211 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/js/app.js:98
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/js/app.js:98 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/ledger-rebuild.html:194
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/ledger-rebuild.html:194 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/logo-lab.html:63
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/logo-lab.html:63 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/metas-mockup.html:99
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/metas-mockup.html:99 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/resumo-mockup.html:270
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/resumo-mockup.html:270 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/screens-rebuild.html:423
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/screens-rebuild.html:423 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tools/fix-historico.html:374
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tools/fix-historico.html:374 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tools/import-historico.html:403
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tools/import-historico.html:403 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tools/seed-history.html:130
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tools/seed-history.html:130 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tools/seed.html:117
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tools/seed.html:117 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in public/js/app.js:2434
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
public/js/app.js:2434 Insert adjacent html
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 16 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 6 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
3 files, 6 locations
.github/workflows/pages.yml:28, 31, 34, 40 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/firebase-hosting.yml:38
.github/workflows/linear-sync.yml:12
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: worker/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
worker/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — public/js/app.js:17
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — worker/src/worker.js:418
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: public/js/app.js (6475 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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