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yifeifelix/CVpolisher

https://github.com/yifeifelix/CVpolisher · scanned 2026-06-16 01:05 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

19 raw signals (0 security + 19 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 18 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 18 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 1 High 0 Medium 5 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 18 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 1 Hardware 3 Security 1 Cicd 1 Quality 11

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.1/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 308 nodes across 4 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 19 findings — concentrated in quality (11), hardware (4), api (1). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 0 high, 5 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 12 of 18 actionable findings. 19 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'private_key_in_repo' in src/lib/ai/google.ts:263

Found a known-risky pattern (private_key_in_repo). Review and replace if possible.

src/lib/ai/google.ts:263 Private key in repo

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/app/result/[id]/cover-letter/page.tsx:68

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 2 occurrences Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22-bookworm-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

lines 1, 17

Dockerfile:1, 17 (2 hits)

containersPinned dependencies

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

9 tests / 58 src (ratio 0.16).

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — server.ts:48

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.

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