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thepetersonbros-blip/mole-in-the-mine

https://github.com/thepetersonbros-blip/mole-in-the-mine · scanned 2026-06-16 00:34 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

14 raw signals (0 security + 14 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 14 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 14 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 6 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 14 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Security 5 Cicd 1 Quality 5 Api 1

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 96.3/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 318 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 14 findings — concentrated in security (5), quality (5), frontend (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 6 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 12 of 14 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/client/ui/hud.ts:17

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/client/ui/hud.ts:17 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/client/ui/meeting.ts:33

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/client/ui/meeting.ts:33 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/client/ui/scoreboard.ts:43

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/client/ui/scoreboard.ts:43 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/client/ui/screens.ts:44

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/client/ui/screens.ts:44 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

9 tests / 38 src (ratio 0.24).

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — src/server/index.ts:6

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /

`src/server/app.ts` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

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