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sakipomco/30nen_next

https://github.com/sakipomco/30nen_next · scanned 2026-06-16 00:00 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

34 raw signals (0 security + 34 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 34 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 34 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 2 High 0 Medium 11 Low 11 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 34 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 8 Security 5 Cicd 1 Quality 20

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 65.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 431 nodes across 19 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 34 findings — concentrated in quality (20), frontend (8), security (5). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 0 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 24 of 34 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/smoke-auth.ts

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

scripts/smoke-auth.ts:11

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/smoke-categories.ts

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

scripts/smoke-categories.ts:48

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/app/(public)/posts/[slug]/page.tsx:146

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/lib/sanitize.ts:4

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — reference/theme/30nen_original/common/js/load-more.js:22

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests, operator-readme. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/app/(public)/posts/[slug]/page.tsx:146

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/app/(public)/posts/[slug]/page.tsx:146 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in reference/theme/30nen_original/common/js/common.js:24

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

reference/theme/30nen_original/common/js/common.js:24 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in reference/theme/30nen_original/common/js/load-more.js:34

Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.

reference/theme/30nen_original/common/js/load-more.js:34 Insert adjacent html

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

1 test file(s) for 79 source file(s) (ratio 0.01). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 13 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `CONTACT_TO_EMAIL`, `DATABASE_PATH`, `EMAIL`, `MAIL_FROM`, `NAME`, `NODE_ENV`, `PASSWORD`, `ROLE` + 5 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.

config drift

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 47 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 README lacks setup or run instructions

A README exists, but it does not contain common install/setup/run markers. This matches a frequent generated-code pattern: UI is present, operational handoff is thin.

ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/create-user.ts:38