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Stef-01/Sous

https://github.com/Stef-01/Sous · scanned 2026-06-16 00:21 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

90 raw signals (2 security + 88 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 90 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 88 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 1 High 1 Medium 16 Low 18 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 2 System graph 88 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 43 Api 1 Frontend 39 Security 6 Cicd 1

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.7/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 3634 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 88 findings — concentrated in quality (41), frontend (39), security (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 35 of 90 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks quality Practices conf 0.82 Foundry mined mock as real or placeholder: Stef-01/Sous

Graph query export: Mock, sample, placeholder, or self-attested behavior treated as real Query id: mock_as_real_or_placeholder Query type: motif_query Intent: Hard negatives for fake completeness and missing real data paths. Motif: mock_as_real_or_placeholder Training usage: hard_negative Graph gol…

high Security checks quality Practices conf 0.84 Foundry mined bad chains: Stef-01/Sous

Comment chain pattern product: bad_chains Repo: Stef-01/Sous Thread: Stef-01/Sous#1 Outcome: ambiguous_needs_more_evidence Thread label: thread_has_human_issue_and_fix_context Source graph label: source_backed_multi_signal_graph Reasons: source_graph_has_real_artifacts, source_graph_has_verificatio…

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/app/cook/[slug]/layout.tsx:39

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/content/save-stanford-image.ts:79

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/super-save/SKILL.md

skills/super-save/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/super-search/SKILL.md

skills/super-search/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction contains unpinned remote install: skills/qmd-sessions/SKILL.md

Remote install commands in agent instructions are a supply-chain risk, especially when an agent can execute shell commands.

skills/qmd-sessions/SKILL.md:124 Supply chainSkill file

medium System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction contains unpinned remote install: skills/qmd/SKILL.md

Remote install commands in agent instructions are a supply-chain risk, especially when an agent can execute shell commands.

skills/qmd/SKILL.md:5 Supply chainSkill file

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/app/cook/[slug]/layout.tsx:39

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/app/cook/[slug]/layout.tsx:39 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in skills/qmd-sessions/hook.js:8

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

skills/qmd-sessions/hook.js:8 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in skills/qmd-sessions/lib.js:3

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

skills/qmd-sessions/lib.js:3 Node child process

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 131 placeholder/mock markers across 54 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 113 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — grants/generate-grant-docx.js:1114