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seyken971/pxlc-nuxt

https://github.com/seyken971/pxlc-nuxt · scanned 2026-06-16 00:08 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

42 raw signals (0 security + 42 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 33 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 9 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 33 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 9 Low 14 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 33 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 12 Security 2 Cicd 3 Quality 16

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 71.9/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 240 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 42 findings — concentrated in quality (16), frontend (12), cicd (12). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 23 of 33 actionable findings. 42 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/new-blog-post/SKILL.md

.claude/skills/new-blog-post/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in _plaquette/export-pdf.mjs:12

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

_plaquette/export-pdf.mjs:12 Node child process

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — .claude/hooks/post-edit-checks.py:49

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 36 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 84 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 10 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 10 locations

.github/workflows/deploy.yml:32, 35, 51, 108, 128, 132, 149 (7 hits)

.github/workflows/lighthouse.yml:34, 37, 43 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — _plaquette/build-pdf.js:29