RakhimovY/postmine — Repobility public scan

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RakhimovY/postmine

https://github.com/RakhimovY/postmine · scanned 2026-06-15 23:46 UTC (2 months, 4 weeks ago)

44 raw signals (0 security + 44 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 4 weeks ago · v1 · 44 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Security checks

100.0% cov · 44 findings

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 1 High 1 Medium 17 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 44 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 2 Network 1 Security 6 Cicd 1 Quality 33

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.7/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1914 nodes across 15 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 44 findings — concentrated in quality (33), security (6), frontend (2). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 1 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 24 of 44 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in e2e/fixtures.ts

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

e2e/fixtures.ts:32

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/seo/json-ld.tsx:27

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/app/api/posts/route.ts:31

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/app/timezone-capture.tsx:22

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/billing/use-billing-gate.ts:17

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/compose/composer-client.tsx:327

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/__tests__/media-upload.test.ts:90

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/platforms/linkedin/index.ts:64

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/services/devto.ts:25

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/services/linkedin.ts:90

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/services/supabase.ts:15

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/seo/json-ld.tsx:27

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/seo/json-ld.tsx:27 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in mockup/assets/ui.jsx:14

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

mockup/assets/ui.jsx:14 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/gen-brand-icons.mjs:19

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/gen-brand-icons.mjs:19 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 80 placeholder/mock markers across 36 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 17 in use

Port 17 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

.github/workflows/codeql.yml Ports

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 7 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `CI`, `E2E_PROD`, `GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY`, `KV_REST_API_TOKEN`, `KV_REST_API_URL`, `NODE_ENV`, `OSV_SCANNER_OUTCOME`. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.

config drift

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 11 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — src/components/compose/__tests__/composer-adapt-flow-persist.test.tsx:222

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/components/compose/composer-client.tsx (1366 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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