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Issue title

Bare except continues silently: Bare `except:` (or `except Exception

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Pick exactly which findings appear in the issue body. By default the top 5 are included. Uncheck noise, check what matters.

Top 5 (default)
Severity Rule Title File:line
HIGH SEC078 [SEC078] Python: requests without timeout: requests.get/post without a timeout will hang … sing-box.py:9
HIGH SEC029 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTT… meta_merge.py:18
HIGH MINED115 [MINED115] Action `actions/setup-python` pinned to mutable ref `@v2`: `uses: actions/setu… .github/workflows/merge.yml:19
HIGH MINED115 [MINED115] Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v2`: `uses: actions/checkout… .github/workflows/merge.yml:16
MED MINED111 [MINED111] Bare except continues silently: Bare `except:` (or `except Exception:`) that r… merge.py:387
MED MINED124 [MINED124] requirements.txt: `geoip2` has no version pin: Unpinned pip requirement means … requirements.txt:2
LOW SEC124 [SEC124] TOCTOU file access (os.access then open): Check-then-use file pattern (access/ex… sing-box.py:15
LOW AIC003 Duplicated implementation block across source files meta_merge.py:4
INFO MINED067 [MINED067] Python Requests No Timeout: requests.get/post/etc. without timeout= can hang f… sing-box.py:9
Reset to top 5 9 findings available (after auto-suppression of test files + won't-fix)

Issue body (markdown)

## Code-quality scan: `Misaka-blog/chromego_merge`

**Score: 75/100 (B)**  ·  9 findings  ·  scanned 2026-06-05 15:07 UTC  ·  734 LOC

| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 0 |
| HIGH | 4 |
| MEDIUM | 2 |
| LOW | 2 |

📊 [Full filterable report](https://repobility.com/scan/8af2125d-6eee-404c-90f0-1c9ed2519c73/)  ·  ![scorecard](https://repobility.com/scan/8af2125d-6eee-404c-90f0-1c9ed2519c73/report.png?v=1780672079-s2)

### Top findings

1. **HIGH** `SEC078` — Python: requests without timeout
   `sing-box.py:9` · A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration
2. **HIGH** `SEC029` — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input
   `meta_merge.py:18` · A10:2021 SSRF
3. **HIGH** `MINED115` — Action `actions/setup-python` pinned to mutable ref `@v2`: `uses
   `.github/workflows/merge.yml:19` · ✓ Repobility
4. **HIGH** `MINED115` — Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v2`: `uses
   `.github/workflows/merge.yml:16` · ✓ Repobility
5. **MEDIUM** `MINED111` — Bare except continues silently: Bare `except:` (or `except Exception
   `merge.py:387` · ✓ Repobility

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**Security note**: this issue is public. If any flagged finding is a real, exploitable vulnerability, please redirect to your `SECURITY.md` policy or open a [private security advisory](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) instead. We're happy to close this and re-submit privately.

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_Filed automatically. Close this issue if not useful — we won't refile. Full report: https://repobility.com/scan/8af2125d-6eee-404c-90f0-1c9ed2519c73/_
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