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Scan timing: clone 2.79s · analysis 14.71s · 1.9 MB · GitHub preflight 413ms

tropical-algae/TABlog

https://github.com/tropical-algae/TABlog · scanned 2026-06-05 18:26 UTC (1 week, 2 days ago) · 10 languages

132 raw signals (86 security + 46 graph) 28th percentile · Javascript · small (2-20K LoC) System graph score 80 (lower by 22)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 week, 2 days ago · v2 · 91 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 18 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 100.0 0.15 15.00
security_score 47.8 0.25 11.95
testing_score 0.0 0.20 0.00
documentation_score 69.7 0.15 10.46
practices_score 77.0 0.15 11.55
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 57.0
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Quality grade C (57/100). Dimensions: security 48, maintainability 100. 86 findings (59 security). 2,985 lines analyzed.

Showing 22 of 91 actionable findings. 109 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 6 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `cycjimmy/semantic-release-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
lines 43, 98, 101, 108, 116
.github/workflows/release.yml:43, 98, 101, 108, 116 (6 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
medium Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC087] JS: weak Math.random for crypto: Math.random() is not cryptographically secure; using it for tokens/keys/nonces is predictable. Ported from gosec G404 / eslint detect-pseudoRandomBytes concept (Apache-2.0).
Use `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')` (Node) or `crypto.getRandomValues()` (browser).
src/utils/theme.js:20
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 ajv: GHSA-2g4f-4pwh-qvx6
ajv has ReDoS when using `$data` option
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 brace-expansion: GHSA-f886-m6hf-6m8v
brace-expansion: Zero-step sequence causes process hang and memory exhaustion
package-lock.json
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 Docker build context has no .dockerignore
Without .dockerignore, build context can include source history, local env files, dependencies, and generated artifacts.
.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 handlebars: GHSA-2qvq-rjwj-gvw9
Handlebars.js has Prototype Pollution Leading to XSS through Partial Template Injection
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 handlebars: GHSA-7rx3-28cr-v5wh
Handlebars.js has a Prototype Method Access Control Gap via Missing __lookupSetter__ Blocklist Entry
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 ip-address: GHSA-v2v4-37r5-5v8g
ip-address has XSS in Address6 HTML-emitting methods
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 lodash-es: GHSA-f23m-r3pf-42rh
lodash vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via array path bypass in `_.unset` and `_.omit`
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 lodash-es: GHSA-xxjr-mmjv-4gpg
Lodash has Prototype Pollution Vulnerability in `_.unset` and `_.omit` functions
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 lodash: GHSA-f23m-r3pf-42rh
lodash vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via array path bypass in `_.unset` and `_.omit`
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 lodash: GHSA-xxjr-mmjv-4gpg
Lodash has Prototype Pollution Vulnerability in `_.unset` and `_.omit` functions
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 picomatch: GHSA-3v7f-55p6-f55p
Picomatch: Method Injection in POSIX Character Classes causes incorrect Glob Matching
package-lock.json
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 postcss: GHSA-qx2v-qp2m-jg93
PostCSS has XSS via Unescaped </style> in its CSS Stringify Output
package-lock.json
medium Security checks quality Quality conf 0.70 Public web app has no Content Security Policy
A Content Security Policy reduces the blast radius of injected scripts if the app is ever served through preview, static hosting, or a web container outside its normal sandbox.
index.html
medium Security checks quality Quality conf 0.78 Public web service has no security.txt
security.txt gives researchers and customers a safe disclosure channel. Public web apps and APIs should publish it under /.well-known/security.txt.
.well-known/security.txt
medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.88 vite: GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps `.map` Handling
package-lock.json
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/utils/http.js:6
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 19 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
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