Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.

sechan9999/LLMai

https://github.com/sechan9999/LLMai · scanned 2026-06-16 00:06 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

36 raw signals (0 security + 36 graph)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 30 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 6 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 62.0/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 746 nodes across 6 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 36 findings — concentrated in cicd (10), software (6), security (6). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 14 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 28 of 30 actionable findings. 36 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `refresh_briefing` without auth dependency — server/app.py:214
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:214 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 6 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 6 locations
.github/workflows/docker.yml:29, 32, 35, 43, 54 (5 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:64
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/docker.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in server/static/index.html:855
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
server/static/index.html:855 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in website/index.html:640
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
website/index.html:640 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in website/landing.html:334
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
website/landing.html:334 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in website/promo.html:683
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
website/promo.html:683 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in llmai/tools.py:389
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
llmai/tools.py:389 Subprocess shell true
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 41 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `GEMINI_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_BASE_URL`, `GEMINI_MODEL`, `GITLAB_PROJECT`, `GITLAB_TOKEN`, `GITLAB_URL`, `GROQ_API_KEY`, `GROQ_MODEL` + 33 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.
config drift
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 45 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/setup-python@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 21, 43
.github/workflows/ci.yml:21, 43 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: bulk_index
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
llmai/elastic/client.py:325
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: decorator
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
llmai/_retry.py:33
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: list_workspace_files
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
llmai/google_cloud.py:30
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: read_workspace_file
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
llmai/google_cloud.py:25
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: repl
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
llmai/mcp/client.py:40
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: search_workspace
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
llmai/google_cloud.py:35
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`server/app.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /briefing
`server/app.py` declares `GET /briefing` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /briefing/status
`server/app.py` declares `GET /briefing/status` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /session
`server/app.py` declares `GET /session` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /briefing/refresh
`server/app.py` declares `POST /briefing/refresh` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/8cba9e7a-eef6-40c1-81a9-26d11ef6e546/

To check status programmatically (no auth required):

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/8cba9e7a-eef6-40c1-81a9-26d11ef6e546/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.