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facebook/lexical

https://github.com/facebook/lexical · scanned 2026-05-16 12:50 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

243 findings (40 legacy + 203 scanner) 16th percentile · Typescript · large (100-500K LoC) Scanner says 77 (lower by 14)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 3 days, 1 hour ago · v1 · 236 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
73.3
/100
Repobility
70
33 legacy
9-layer
77
100.0% cov · 203 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Score breakdown â 2026-05-17-v4 calibration-aware
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 60.0 0.15 9.00
security_score 87.4 0.25 21.85
testing_score 31.0 0.20 6.20
documentation_score 60.0 0.15 9.00
practices_score 55.0 0.15 8.25
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 62.3
Calibrated penalty buckets (security_score): web: 1.6 · threat: 11.0
security_score may be inflated — optional scanners skipped due to repo size/fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 8 Medium 15 Low 108 Source: Legacy 33 9-layer 203 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 89 Security 6 Software 56 Api 1 Frontend 74 Cicd 10
Scan summary Repository scanned at 76.7/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 5112 nodes across 3 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 203 findings — concentrated in frontend (74), quality (65), software (50). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 236 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Legacy security injection conf 0.50 [SEC005] Command Injection Risk: Unsafe shell execution or eval of user input.
Use subprocess with shell=False and a list of args. Never eval user input.
packages/lexical-playground/src/plugins/AutoEmbedPlugin/index.tsx:180 injectionlegacy
medium Legacy software redos conf 1.00 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like `(a+)+` or quantified alternation with overlapping branches. On adversarial input these patterns exhibit exponential backtracking, freezing the process. CWE-1333. Real CVEs: CVE-2017-16129 (minimatch), CVE-2021-3807 (ansi-regex), and dozens more.
Three options, pick one: 1. Rewrite the pattern to avoid nested quantifiers. E.g. `(a+)+` is functionally equivalent to `a+` for matching purposes. 2. Use Google's re2 (`pip install google-re2`): linear-time, drop-in replacement for `re` for most use cases. 3. Set a hard timeout: `s…
packages/lexical-markdown/src/MarkdownTransformers.ts:229 redoslegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 Public web service has no security.txt
security.txt gives researchers and customers a safe disclosure channel. Public web apps and APIs should publish it under /.well-known/security.txt.
.well-known/security.txt qualitylegacy
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — examples/nextjs-code-shiki/app/EditorClient.tsx:40
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — examples/node-state-style/src/plugins/ShikiViewPlugin.tsx:87
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — flow-typed/environments/jsx.js:857
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — packages/lexical-playground/src/nodes/ExcalidrawNode/ExcalidrawImage.tsx:134
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — flow-typed/environments/bom.js:1615
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/call-increment-version.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/version.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/call-post-release.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/nightly-release.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/pre-release.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in flow-typed/environments/jsx.js:857
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
flow-typed/environments/jsx.js:857 owaspdangerous_innerhtml
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in packages/lexical-playground/src/nodes/ExcalidrawNode/ExcalidrawImage.tsx:134
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
packages/lexical-playground/src/nodes/ExcalidrawNode/ExcalidrawImage.tsx:134 owaspdangerous_innerhtml
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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