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slimmsyd/OnCode-Software-Agency

https://github.com/slimmsyd/OnCode-Software-Agency · scanned 2026-06-16 00:16 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

41 raw signals (0 security + 41 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 41 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 41 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 3 High 7 Medium 15 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 41 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 10 Security 7 Cicd 1 Quality 16 Api 7

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 61.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 436 nodes across 20 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 41 findings — concentrated in quality (16), frontend (10), security (7). Risk profile is high: 3 critical, 7 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 37 of 41 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Runtime dotenv file present in repo: my-app/.env

`my-app/.env` looks like a runtime dotenv file. It contains secret-looking assignments for OPENAI_API_KEY, TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN, GOOGLE_API_KEY. Move real values to a secret manager and keep only `.env.example` style templates in source control.

my-app/.env ConfigEnv fileRuntime env

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Runtime dotenv file present in repo: my-app/.env.local

`my-app/.env.local` looks like a runtime dotenv file. It contains secret-looking assignments for TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN, OPENAI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY. Move real values to a secret manager and keep only `.env.example` style templates in source control.

my-app/.env.local ConfigEnv fileRuntime env

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Runtime dotenv file present in repo: my-app/python/.env

`my-app/python/.env` looks like a runtime dotenv file. It contains secret-looking assignments for OPENAI_API_KEY, TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN. Move real values to a secret manager and keep only `.env.example` style templates in source control.

my-app/python/.env ConfigEnv fileRuntime env

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/google-reviews (my-app/src/app/hooks/useGoogleReviews.ts:53)

`my-app/src/app/hooks/useGoogleReviews.ts:53` calls `GET /api/google-reviews` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/google-reviews` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matche…

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/chatBot (my-app/src/app/components/ChatPopup.tsx:404)

`my-app/src/app/components/ChatPopup.tsx:404` calls `POST /api/chatBot` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/chatbot` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/validateIdea (my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:75)

`my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:75` calls `POST /api/validateIdea` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/validateidea` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matc…

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://godofai.app.n8n.cloud/webhook/228d6cec-48b3-4c6d-9628-f1951ae4fcc3 (my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:108)

`my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:108` calls `POST https://godofai.app.n8n.cloud/webhook/228d6cec-48b3-4c6d-9628-f1951ae4fcc3` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/godofai.app.n8n.cloud…

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://hook.us1.make.com/asyohb1n2p93mooqkdm7x3sax4ihnw8s (my-app/src/app/components/onboarding/OnboardingForm.tsx:98)

`my-app/src/app/components/onboarding/OnboardingForm.tsx:98` calls `POST https://hook.us1.make.com/asyohb1n2p93mooqkdm7x3sax4ihnw8s` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/hook.us1.make.com/asyohb1n2p…

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://hook.us1.make.com/weto5s8cei9yev2bt3kutqvcoqfzeajf (my-app/src/app/components/HomePage.tsx:136)

`my-app/src/app/components/HomePage.tsx:136` calls `POST https://hook.us1.make.com/weto5s8cei9yev2bt3kutqvcoqfzeajf` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/hook.us1.make.com/weto5s8cei9yev2bt3kutqvcoq…

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `analyze_idea` without auth dependency — my-app/python/main.py:25

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

my-app/python/main.py:25 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — my-app/src/app/components/ChatPopup.tsx:565

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:376

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — my-app/src/app/api/google-reviews/route.ts:16

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — my-app/src/app/components/ChatPopup.tsx:166

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — my-app/src/app/components/onboarding/OnboardingForm.tsx:98

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in my-app/src/app/components/ChatPopup.tsx:565

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

my-app/src/app/components/ChatPopup.tsx:565 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:376

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

my-app/src/app/components/HeaderComponent.tsx:376 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 44 placeholder/mock markers across 11 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

2 test file(s) for 96 source file(s) (ratio 0.02). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 27 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — my-app/src/app/api/sendEmail/route.ts:8