samkjsong-bot/OrchestrAI — Repobility public scan

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samkjsong-bot/OrchestrAI

https://github.com/samkjsong-bot/OrchestrAI · scanned 2026-06-16 00:01 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

30 raw signals (0 security + 30 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 29 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Security checks

88.9% cov · 29 findings

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 16 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 29 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 8 Cicd 3 Quality 17

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 73.6/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 489 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 30 findings — concentrated in quality (17), security (8), cicd (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 21 of 29 actionable findings. 30 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'new_function_used' in src/auth/geminiAuth.ts:11

Found a known-risky pattern (new_function_used). Review and replace if possible.

src/auth/geminiAuth.ts:11 New function used

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'new_function_used' in src/providers/geminiProvider.ts:29

Found a known-risky pattern (new_function_used). Review and replace if possible.

src/providers/geminiProvider.ts:29 New function used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/extension.ts:5084

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/providers/codexProvider.ts:185

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/telegram/bridge.ts:587

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/telegram/client.ts:63

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/util/agentMarketplace.ts:29

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/util/captain.ts:135

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

softprops/action-gh-release@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/publish.yml:70 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/publish.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in webview/chat.html:3257

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

webview/chat.html:3257 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/auth/claudeAuth.ts:6

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/auth/claudeAuth.ts:6 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/context/contextBundle.ts:10

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/context/contextBundle.ts:10 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/extension.ts:3322

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/extension.ts:3322 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/util/commitMessage.ts:5

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/util/commitMessage.ts:5 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 22 placeholder/mock markers across 3 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/setup-node@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 26, 52

.github/workflows/ci.yml:26, 52 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/extension.ts (5979 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/telegram/bridge.ts (1253 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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