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tainakanchu/itunes-playlist-viewer

https://github.com/tainakanchu/itunes-playlist-viewer · scanned 2026-06-16 00:28 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

43 raw signals (0 security + 43 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 25 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 18 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 25 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 18 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 25 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 4 Security 6 Cicd 3 Quality 12

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 64.0/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 409 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 43 findings — concentrated in cicd (21), quality (12), security (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 27 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 25 actionable findings. 43 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/dirB2.jsx:139

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/dirB3.jsx:117

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/icons.jsx:65

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/Icon.tsx:102

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/design-canvas.jsx:135

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 10 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

pnpm/action-setup@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 24, 35, 40, 136, 176, 185, 188, 221, +2 more

.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:24, 35, 40, 136, 176, 185, 188, 221, +2 more (10 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/build-windows.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/dirB2.jsx:139

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/dirB2.jsx:139 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/dirB3.jsx:117

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/dirB3.jsx:117 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/icons.jsx:65

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

docs/design_handoff_cratebox/prototype/icons.jsx:65 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/Icon.tsx:102

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/components/Icon.tsx:102 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/gen-licenses.mjs:14

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/gen-licenses.mjs:14 Node child process

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 31 placeholder/mock markers across 12 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 111 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 10 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 21, 29, 92, 100, 108, 156, 179, 210, +2 more

.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:21, 29, 92, 100, 108, 156, 179, 210, +2 more (10 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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