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suraj-davariya/ai-job-search

https://github.com/suraj-davariya/ai-job-search · scanned 2026-06-16 00:26 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

22 raw signals (0 security + 22 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 20 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 20 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 11 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 20 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 3 Security 3 Cicd 3 Quality 10

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 641 nodes across 10 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 22 findings — concentrated in quality (10), cicd (5), frontend (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 16 of 20 actionable findings. 22 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — dashboard/components/console/RunLog.tsx:107

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/commands/expand.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/commands/expand.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/commands/reset.md

.claude/commands/reset.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/commands/search.md

.claude/commands/search.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/job-application-assistant/06-cover-letter-templates.md

.claude/skills/job-application-assistant/06-cover-letter-templates.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/job-scraper/search-queries.md

.claude/skills/job-scraper/search-queries.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/pages.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in dashboard/lib/run/spawn.ts:11

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/lib/run/spawn.ts:11 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in dashboard/scripts/export-demo.mjs:21

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/scripts/export-demo.mjs:21 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in dashboard/scripts/start.mjs:11

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/scripts/start.mjs:11 Node child process

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 35 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/configure-pages@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 56, 99, 112

.github/workflows/pages.yml:56, 99, 112 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

docs-site/package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — dashboard/test/perf/perf.test.ts:16

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

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