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yazelin/k-rider

https://github.com/yazelin/k-rider · scanned 2026-06-16 01:05 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

23 raw signals (0 security + 23 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 23 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
85.2
/100
Security checks
85
0 findings
System graph
85
88.9% cov · 23 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 18 Low 3 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 23 Crowd 0 Layer: Data 1 Frontend 1 Security 11 Cicd 3 Quality 7
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 85.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 323 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 23 findings — concentrated in security (11), quality (7), cicd (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 18 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 21 of 23 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/gen-daily-copy.mjs:16
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/gen-events.mjs:28
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/ui/data.js:12
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — worker/src/quote.js:36
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/update-data.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/admin.html:51
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
public/admin.html:51 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/game/hud.js:7
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/game/hud.js:7 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/main.js:12
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/main.js:12 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/about.js:31
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/about.js:31 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/home.js:72
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/home.js:72 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/leaderboard.js:7
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/leaderboard.js:7 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/ride.js:29
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/ride.js:29 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/settle.js:53
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/settle.js:53 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in src/ui/ride.js:65
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/ride.js:65 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in public/admin.html:42
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
public/admin.html:42 Local storage auth token
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph data Coverage conf 1.00 ORM models found but no DB engine detected
The repo defines tables/models but no DB connection string was found. Likely lives in env vars or a config file the scanner didn't read.
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 5 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/deploy-pages@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml:30 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
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