github/gh-aw

Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.

74 of your 164 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

Upstream (GitHub) caused delay on this scan — not Repobility.

GitHub API rate-limited (HTTP 403) — preflight skipped, fell back to direct git clone.
Clone from GitHub took 278.09s for a 326.4 MB repo slow.
Repobility's analysis ran in 26.66s after the clone landed.

https://github.com/github/gh-aw · scanned 2026-06-05 14:43 UTC (5 days, 3 hours ago) · 10 languages

143 findings 11/13 scanners ran 100th percentile · Go · huge (>500K LoC)

File as issue Image

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

55 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 88 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5

Component	Sub-score	Weight	Contribution
`structure_score`	85.0	0.15	12.75
`security_score`	100.0	0.25	25.00
`testing_score`	85.0	0.20	17.00
`documentation_score`	97.0	0.15	14.55
`practices_score`	100.0	0.15	15.00
`code_quality`	68.0	0.10	6.80
Overall		1.00	91.1

security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 2 High 12 Medium 8 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 55 System graph 0 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 11 Security 4 Cicd 7 Quality 33

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Showing 26 of 55 actionable findings. 143 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED013] Password In Url: https://user:password@host — leaks creds via logs, referrer, error messages.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-200 / A07:2021 for context.

3 files, 3 locations

actions/setup/js/extra_empty_commit.cjs:149

actions/setup/js/push_experiment_state.cjs:115

actions/setup/js/run_operation_update_upgrade.cjs:164

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 21 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow

Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.

lines 81, 84, 85, 86, 204, 505, 507, 747, +13 more

.github/workflows/smoke-agent-public-approved.lock.yml:81, 84, 85, 86, 204, 505, 507, 747, +13 more (21 hits)

CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions

low Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED012] Curl Pipe Bash: curl ... | sh / bash — runs unverified network code.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-494 / A08:2021 for context.

3 files, 3 locations

.devcontainer/setup.sh:30

pkg/cli/devcontainer.go:157

pkg/workflow/pip_validation.go:163

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED117] Workflow declares `permissions: write-all`: The job's GITHUB_TOKEN gets EVERY permission scope. If the workflow is ever compromised (mutable action, fork PR, injected step), the attacker can push to main, publish packages, alter releases. Use least-privilege by listing only the scopes the job actually needs.

Replace with a scoped block: `permissions:\n contents: read\n issues: write` (only the scopes you need).

.github/workflows/permissions.yml:150

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED118] Dockerfile FROM `alpine:3.21` not pinned by digest: `FROM alpine:3.21` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.

Replace with: `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:<digest>`. Get the digest from `docker manifest inspect`. Re-pin via a scheduled bot (Renovate, Dependabot).

Dockerfile:5

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED118] Dockerfile FROM `mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/go:1-bookworm` not pinned by digest: `FROM mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/go:1-bookworm` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.

Replace with: `FROM mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/go:1-bookworm@sha256:<digest>`. Get the digest from `docker manifest inspect`. Re-pin via a scheduled bot (Renovate, Dependabot).

.devcontainer/Dockerfile:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED122] package.json dep `@actions/github-script` pulled from URL/Git: `devDependencies.@actions/github-script` = `github:actions/github-script#v9.0.0` bypasses the npm registry. No integrity hash, no version locking, no registry-side scanning. If the URL or git host is compromised, every `npm install` pulls the new payload.

Publish the dependency to npm (or your private registry) and reference it by `^x.y.z`. If that's not possible, lock by commit SHA: `git+https://...#<full-sha>` AND verify the SHA in CI.

actions/setup/js/package.json:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED126] Workflow container/services image `redis:7` unpinned: `container/services image: redis:7` without `@sha256:...` pulls a mutable tag at workflow-run time. Treat workflow container references with the same supply-chain discipline as Dockerfile FROM lines.

Replace with `redis:7@sha256:<digest>`. Re-pin via Dependabot Docker scope.

.github/workflows/smoke-service-ports.lock.yml:413

high Security checks security secrets conf 1.00 [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials was committed. AI coding agents often add these commands while trying to help with setup or deployment, but they can leak live secrets through logs, shell history, CI output, or documentation.

Remove the command, use a secret manager or CI masked secret, and rotate any credential that may have been printed.

pkg/parser/github.go:75

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`: `uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lo…

lines 20, 25

.github/workflows/error-message-lint.yml:20, 25 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

medium Security checks security auth conf 0.92 [AUC001] No Repobility access matrix policy found: The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.

Add .repobility/access.yml mapping routes to anonymous, authenticated, owner, admin, and super_admin. Keep business-specific rules in the repo so CI can enforce them.

medium Security checks quality Error handling conf 1.00 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors.

Log the error or rethrow it. Use console.error() at minimum.

actions/setup/js/action_setup_otlp.cjs:191

medium Security checks quality Error handling conf 1.00 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors.

Log the error or rethrow it. Use console.error() at minimum.

actions/setup/js/action_conclusion_otlp.cjs:97

medium Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED124] requirements.txt: `markitdown-mcp` has no version pin: Unpinned pip requirement means every fresh install may resolve a different version. Newer releases can introduce malicious code (typosquats, account compromises). Reproducible installs need exact pins.

Replace `markitdown-mcp` with `markitdown-mcp==<version>` and manage upgrades through PRs / Dependabot.

lines 2, 3, 4

.github/workflows/requirements.txt:2, 3, 4 (3 hits)

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 Docker build context has no .dockerignore

Add .dockerignore with at least .git, .env, private keys, dependency folders, build outputs, and local databases.

.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.84 Docker build context is very large

Shrink the build context with .dockerignore, move generated/runtime data outside the build context, and copy only the manifest files needed for cached dependency layers.

.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER

Add a non-root USER in the final runtime stage after files and permissions are prepared.

Dockerfile:5 CI/CD securitycontainers

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER

Add a non-root USER in the final runtime stage after files and permissions are prepared.

.devcontainer/Dockerfile:1 CI/CD securitycontainers

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.82 Parallel implementation file sits beside a canonical file

Merge the intended change into the canonical file, update tests/imports, and delete the parallel implementation if it is not the active entry point.

pkg/cli/outcome_eval_update.go:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.70 3 occurrences Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell

Publish a package-manager install path or add checksum/signature verification before execution. For docs, show the inspect-then-run flow and pin the downloaded artifact version.

3 files, 3 locations

.devcontainer/devcontainer.json:50

.github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:17

.github/workflows/daily-byok-ollama-test.md:23

medium Security checks quality Quality conf 0.78 Suspicious implementation file appears unreferenced

Confirm whether this file is reachable. If not, delete it; if yes, wire it through explicit imports, routes, or entry points and add a test that proves the path executes.

pkg/cli/outcome_eval_update.go:1

low Security checks quality Error handling conf 1.00 3 occurrences [ERR003] Ignored Error (Go): Ignoring error return values.

Handle the error or use errcheck linter.

3 files, 3 locations

pkg/cli/completions.go:129

pkg/cli/deploy_command.go:54

pkg/cli/deps_outdated.go:169

low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.60 30 occurrences Duplicated implementation block across source files

Duplicate implementation blocks are maintenance debt. Keep them visible, but they are not a high-severity defect unless the duplicated logic is security-sensitive or drifting.

12 files, 14 locations

pkg/cli/codemod_github_repos.go:26, 54 (2 hits)

pkg/linters/ossetenvlibrary/ossetenvlibrary.go:22, 24 (2 hits)

.github/drivers/copilot_sdk_driver_sample_typescript.ts:29

pkg/cli/codemod_assign_to_agent.go:45

pkg/cli/codemod_bash_single_quoted_args.go:17

pkg/cli/codemod_dependabot_permissions.go:105

pkg/cli/codemod_difc_proxy.go:66

pkg/cli/codemod_engine_max_turns.go:39

duplicationquality

low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.74 robots.txt does not advertise a sitemap

Add `Sitemap: https://your-domain.example/sitemap.xml` to robots.txt.

.github/aw/syntax-agentic.md

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.62 Source file name looks like an AI patch artifact

Rename it to the domain concept it implements or merge it into the existing module it was meant to change.

pkg/workflow/create_project_status_update.go:1

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.62 Source file name looks like an AI patch artifact

Rename it to the domain concept it implements or merge it into the existing module it was meant to change.

pkg/parser/workflow_update.go:1

For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.

For AI agents + API integrations

Email me when this repo regresses

Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.

API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/9488f272-c437-48f0-b23b-8dcbe61d9d74/

To check status programmatically (no auth required):

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/9488f272-c437-48f0-b23b-8dcbe61d9d74/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.