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sabermh46/audio-vis

https://github.com/sabermh46/audio-vis · scanned 2026-06-15 23:59 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

31 raw signals (0 security + 31 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 31 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
74.5
/100
Security checks
75
0 findings
System graph
75
100.0% cov · 31 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 4 Medium 13 Low 10 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 31 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 11 Cicd 1 Quality 10 Api 8
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 74.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 213 nodes across 9 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 31 findings — concentrated in security (11), quality (10), api (8). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 4 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 31 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI DELETE `library_delete` without auth dependency — server/app.py:183
`@router.delete` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:183 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI PATCH `library_rename` without auth dependency — server/app.py:190
`@router.patch` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:190 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `analyze_upload` without auth dependency — server/app.py:98
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:98 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI PUT `library_put_scenes` without auth dependency — server/app.py:206
`@router.put` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:206 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/core/AnalysisClient.js:94
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/App.js:67
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/App.js:67 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/DropZone.js:18
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/DropZone.js:18 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/SceneEditor.js:55
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/SceneEditor.js:55 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/StartupModal.js:25
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/StartupModal.js:25 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/StatusIndicator.js:13
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/StatusIndicator.js:13 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/TransportControls.js:26
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/ui/TransportControls.js:26 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 41 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /library/{tid}
`server/app.py` declares `DELETE /library/{tid}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /library
`server/app.py` declares `GET /library` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /library/{tid}/analysis
`server/app.py` declares `GET /library/{tid}/analysis` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /library/{tid}/audio
`server/app.py` declares `GET /library/{tid}/audio` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /library/{tid}/scenes
`server/app.py` declares `GET /library/{tid}/scenes` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PATCH /library/{tid}
`server/app.py` declares `PATCH /library/{tid}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /analyze
`server/app.py` declares `POST /analyze` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PUT /library/{tid}/scenes
`server/app.py` declares `PUT /library/{tid}/scenes` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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