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Issue title

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input

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Pick exactly which findings appear in the issue body. By default the top 5 are included. Uncheck noise, check what matters.

Top 5 (default)
Severity Rule Title File:line
HIGH SEC018 [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials w… src/utils/secureStorage/macOsKeychainSt…:40
HIGH SEC018 [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials w… src/utils/auth.ts:1090
HIGH SEC029 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTT… scripts/system-check.ts:122
HIGH SEC029 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTT… scripts/pr-intent-scan.ts:156
HIGH SEC029 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTT… python/atomic_chat_provider.py:26
HIGH SEC016 [SEC016] LLM Prompt Injection — User Input in AI Prompt: User-supplied text is interpolat… src/commands/thinkback/thinkback.tsx:385
HIGH JRN004 Consent is collected in UI without visible backend audit persistence src/screens/REPL.tsx:3145
MED SEC031 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like … src/tools/shared/gitOperationTracking.ts:23
MED SEC031 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like … src/tools/BashTool/readOnlyValidation.ts:1358
MED ERR002 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors. src/bridge/replBridge.ts:479
MED ERR002 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors. src/bridge/initReplBridge.ts:328
MED ERR002 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors. src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts:2068
MED SEC017 [SEC017] Unbounded Input to LLM/External API: User input is passed to an LLM or external … src/commands/thinkback/thinkback.tsx:385
MED WEB003 Public web service has no security.txt .well-known/security.txt
MED AGT006 React interval is created without an explicit cleanup src/components/Spinner/useShimmerAnimat…:13
MED AGT006 React interval is created without an explicit cleanup src/cli/print.ts:543
MED WEB015 Public web app has no Content Security Policy index.html
LOW WEB001 Public web app has no robots.txt robots.txt
LOW WEB002 Public web app has no sitemap sitemap.xml
LOW DKR008 .dockerignore misses sensitive defaults .dockerignore
LOW WEB008 Public docs site has no llms.txt llms.txt
LOW WEB011 Public web app has no humans.txt humans.txt
Reset to top 5 22 findings available (after auto-suppression of test files + won't-fix)

Issue body (markdown)

## Code-quality scan: `Gitlawb/openclaude`

**Score: 74/100 (B+)**  ·  22 findings  ·  scanned 2026-05-17 19:32 UTC  ·  605,364 LOC

| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 0 |
| HIGH | 7 |
| MEDIUM | 10 |
| LOW | 5 |

📊 [Full filterable report](https://repobility.com/scan/9538c3bf-0f97-41c1-9ac9-c862f7f43a34/)  ·  ![scorecard](https://repobility.com/scan/9538c3bf-0f97-41c1-9ac9-c862f7f43a34/report.png?v=1779046320-s2)

### Top findings

1. **HIGH** `SEC018` — AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command
   `src/utils/secureStorage/macOsKeychainStorage.ts:40` · A07:2021 Identification & Authentication Failures
2. **HIGH** `SEC018` — AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command
   `src/utils/auth.ts:1090` · A07:2021 Identification & Authentication Failures
3. **HIGH** `SEC029` — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input
   `scripts/system-check.ts:122` · A10:2021 SSRF
4. **HIGH** `SEC029` — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input
   `scripts/pr-intent-scan.ts:156` · A10:2021 SSRF
5. **HIGH** `SEC029` — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input
   `python/atomic_chat_provider.py:26` · A10:2021 SSRF

---

**Security note**: this issue is public. If any flagged finding is a real, exploitable vulnerability, please redirect to your `SECURITY.md` policy or open a [private security advisory](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) instead. We're happy to close this and re-submit privately.

---

_Filed automatically. Close this issue if not useful — we won't refile. Full report: https://repobility.com/scan/9538c3bf-0f97-41c1-9ac9-c862f7f43a34/_
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This repo publishes a SECURITY.md policy and the scan contains 6 Critical/High security finding(s). Public issue filing would violate coordinated disclosure. Submit privately via the project's security reporting channel.
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