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samanamp/recall

https://github.com/samanamp/recall · scanned 2026-06-16 00:00 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

29 raw signals (0 security + 29 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 27 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
79.9
/100
Security checks
80
0 findings
System graph
80
100.0% cov · 27 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 11 Low 11 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 27 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 1 Frontend 2 Security 5 Cicd 1 Quality 12 Api 6
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 79.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 373 nodes across 25 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 29 findings — concentrated in quality (14), api (6), security (5). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 27 actionable findings. 29 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/src/lib/api.ts:124
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tools/optimize-repo-images.mjs:11
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — worker/src/github.ts:28
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Frontend route `/review/:deck` has no Link/navigate to it — app/src/App.tsx
The route is registered but no `<Link to=…>` or `navigate(…)` in the codebase navigates here. Either it's reachable only via direct URL (intentional), it's dead, or the link broke during a refactor.
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
Orphan pageWiring
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in worker/src/index.ts:43
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
worker/src/index.ts:43 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in extension/content.js:32
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
extension/content.js:32 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in tools/demo-video.mjs:12
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
tools/demo-video.mjs:12 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in tools/setup.mjs:15
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
tools/setup.mjs:15 Node child process
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 29 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
8 tests / 46 src (ratio 0.17).
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: tools/anki-import-template.py:ulid, tools/archive-sd_runner.py:ulid This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: push_reviews
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
tools/archive-sd_runner.py:57
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /cards/file
`worker/src/index.ts` declares `GET /cards/file` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /media/file
`worker/src/index.ts` declares `GET /media/file` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /reviews
`worker/src/index.ts` declares `GET /reviews` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /reviews/export
`worker/src/index.ts` declares `GET /reviews/export` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /cards
`worker/src/index.ts` declares `POST /cards` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /flashcard
`worker/src/index.ts` declares `POST /flashcard` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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