openfrontio/OpenFrontIO

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51 of your 126 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

Upstream (GitHub) caused delay on this scan — not Repobility.

GitHub API rate-limited (HTTP 403) — preflight skipped, fell back to direct git clone.
Clone from GitHub took 245.52s for a 562.3 MB repo slow.
Repobility's analysis ran in 8.44s after the clone landed.

https://github.com/openfrontio/OpenFrontIO · scanned 2026-06-05 20:59 UTC (1 week, 2 days ago) · 10 languages

119 findings 11/13 scanners ran 96th percentile · Typescript · large (100-500K LoC)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

46 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 73 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5

Component	Sub-score	Weight	Contribution
`structure_score`	85.0	0.15	12.75
`security_score`	100.0	0.25	25.00
`testing_score`	90.0	0.20	18.00
`documentation_score`	77.0	0.15	11.55
`practices_score`	93.0	0.15	13.95
`code_quality`	70.0	0.10	7.00
Overall		1.00	88.2

security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 17 Medium 7 Low 8 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 46 System graph 0 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 26 Security 11 Cicd 5 Software 4

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Showing 14 of 46 actionable findings. 119 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Security checks security auth conf 0.88 Token handoff appears to use a callback URL or fragment

Use a server-side one-time authorization code tied to a registered callback allowlist. Do not append access tokens to callback URLs or fragments.

src/client/Auth.ts:19

high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: GET /api/game/:id.

Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.

src/server/Worker.ts:218

Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.

src/server/GamePreviewRoute.ts:82

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED031] React Direct State Mutation: this.state.X = Y mutates without setState. React wont re-render.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-682 / for context.

src/client/view/UnitView.ts:117

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.80 ✓ Repobility [MINED113] Express POST /api/archive_singleplayer_game has no auth: Express route POST /api/archive_singleplayer_game declared without an auth middleware in its handler chain. Destructive methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) on unauthenticated routes are OWASP A01:2021 broken access control.

Add an auth middleware: app.post('/api/archive_singleplayer_game', requireAuth, handler) — or mount the router under app.use('/api', authMiddleware) and ensure the path is covered. If truly public, mark with a comment.

src/server/Worker.ts:235

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.80 ✓ Repobility [MINED113] Express POST /api/create_game/:id has no auth: Express route POST /api/create_game/:id declared without an auth middleware in its handler chain. Destructive methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) on unauthenticated routes are OWASP A01:2021 broken access control.

Add an auth middleware: app.post('/api/create_game/:id', requireAuth, handler) — or mount the router under app.use('/api', authMiddleware) and ensure the path is covered. If truly public, mark with a comment.

src/server/Worker.ts:142

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED118] Dockerfile FROM `node:24-slim` not pinned by digest: `FROM node:24-slim` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.

Replace with: `FROM node:24-slim@sha256:<digest>`. Get the digest from `docker manifest inspect`. Re-pin via a scheduled bot (Renovate, Dependabot).

Dockerfile:2

high Security checks security auth conf 0.78 Consent is collected in UI without visible backend audit persistence

Persist consent as a backend record with subject, actor, purpose, scope, legal text version, timestamp, IP address, user agent, and revocation state.

resources/privacy-policy.html:460

high Security checks security auth conf 0.74 [AUC002] Low visible authorization coverage in route inventory: Only 42.9% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.

Review the access matrix and add explicit framework auth declarations or policy-file exceptions for intentionally public routes.

high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /api/archive_singleplayer_game.

Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.

src/server/Worker.ts:235

Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.

src/server/Worker.ts:142

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER

Add a non-root USER in the final runtime stage after files and permissions are prepared.

Dockerfile:35 CI/CD securitycontainers

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.74 9 occurrences Frontend API reference is not matched by discovered backend routes

Add the backend route, update the frontend constant to the implemented endpoint, or document that the route is served by another service and exclude it with .repobilityignore.

2 files, 9 locations

tests/pathfinding/playground/server.ts:30, 48, 77, 116, 177, 222 (6 hits)

tests/pathfinding/playground/public/client.js:864, 942, 1153 (3 hits)

high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.80 localStorage write failures are swallowed silently

Handle QuotaExceededError explicitly, show a toast or error state, and guide the user to export/clear old local data. Log non-quota failures for diagnostics.

src/client/components/IOSAddToHomeScreenBanner.ts:35

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