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huggingface/accelerate

https://github.com/huggingface/accelerate.git · scanned 2026-05-18 14:47 UTC (3 weeks, 4 days ago) · 10 languages

644 raw signals (92 security + 552 graph) 56th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) System graph score 77 (lower by 10)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 3 weeks, 4 days ago · v3 · 152 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 96 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
69.5
/100
Security checks
62
47 findings
System graph
77
88.9% cov · 105 findings
Critical
2
click to filter
Agents
6
1 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 85.0 0.15 12.75
security_score 34.0 0.25 8.50
testing_score 90.0 0.20 18.00
documentation_score 90.0 0.15 13.50
practices_score 72.0 0.15 10.80
code_quality 36.0 0.10 3.60
Overall 1.00 67.1
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 2 High 13 Medium 22 Low 53 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 47 System graph 105 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 86 Cicd 10 Security 18 Software 21 Api 1 Network 1 Hardware 14 Frontend 1
Scan summary Quality grade B- (67/100). Dimensions: security 34, maintainability 85. 92 findings (12 security). 63,090 lines analyzed.

Showing 22 of 152 actionable findings. 248 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC123] Production stack trace / debug output exposed: Debug mode left on in production exposes stack traces, environment variables, framework internals — sometimes triggers RCE (Django debug page with arbitrary template eval).
Set DEBUG=False / APP_DEBUG=false in production. Provide a generic 500 handler that logs to backend but returns a sanitized page to clients.
src/accelerate/launchers.py:308
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 Docker build context has no .dockerignore
Without .dockerignore, build context can include source history, local env files, dependencies, and generated artifacts.
.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.94 Dockerfile base image uses the latest tag
The latest tag is mutable and can change without a code review, producing different images from the same source.
docker/accelerate-gpu-deepspeed/Dockerfile:5 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.94 Dockerfile base image uses the latest tag
The latest tag is mutable and can change without a code review, producing different images from the same source.
docker/accelerate-gpu/Dockerfile:5 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.86 Dockerfile separates apt update from install
Splitting apt update and install across layers can reuse stale package indexes and make builds less reliable.
docker/accelerate-cpu/Dockerfile:8 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: continuumio/miniconda3:latest
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
docker/accelerate-gpu-deepspeed/Dockerfile:5 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: continuumio/miniconda3:latest
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
docker/accelerate-gpu/Dockerfile:5 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: ghcr.io/azure/msamp
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
benchmarks/fp8/ms_amp/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: benchmarks/fp8/ms_amp/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: benchmarks/fp8/torchao/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: benchmarks/fp8/transformer_engine/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: docker/accelerate-gpu-deepspeed/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: docker/accelerate-gpu/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 12 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 20, 22, 31, 45, 47, 56, 70, 72, +4 more
.github/workflows/build_docker_images.yml:20, 22, 31, 45, 47, 56, 70, 72, +4 more (12 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — src/accelerate/commands/env.py:93
`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — src/accelerate/commands/launch.py:989
`subprocess.Popen(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — src/accelerate/commands/tpu.py:149
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — src/accelerate/utils/environment.py:176
`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — src/accelerate/utils/launch.py:73
`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — src/accelerate/utils/torch_xla.py:43
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 59 in use
Port 59 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
examples/slurm/submit_multigpu.sh Ports
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