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SlowBearDigger/xmr-pay

https://github.com/SlowBearDigger/xmr-pay · scanned 2026-06-16 00:15 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

71 raw signals (0 security + 71 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 70 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 70 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 4 High 0 Medium 9 Low 30 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 70 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 27 Security 8 Cicd 2 Quality 32 Api 1

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 73.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 302 nodes across 1 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 71 findings — concentrated in quality (32), frontend (27), security (9). Risk profile is high: 5 critical, 0 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 39 of 70 actionable findings. 71 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — test/chaos.test.js:11

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — test/verify-rpc.test.js:2

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

softprops/action-gh-release@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/release.yml:37 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in demo/api/verify-payment.js:9

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

demo/api/verify-payment.js:9 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in widget/xmr-pay.js:2588

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

widget/xmr-pay.js:2588 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in widget/xmr-pay.part.js:287

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

widget/xmr-pay.part.js:287 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 15 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — demo/server.js:25